Weighing Evidence - Chapter 10: Judicial notice and specialized knowledge

10. Judicial notice and specialized knowledge

10.1 Judicial notice

Facts that can be “judicially noticed” are facts so notorious or generally accepted as not to be the subject of debate among reasonable persons; or capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to readily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.^{Footnote 336} Judicial notice is invoked to relieve parties from having to prove facts that are not in dispute. Thus, when judicial notice is taken of a fact, no formal evidence of that fact must be introduced at the trial or hearing.

The purpose of taking judicial notice is to shorten the proceeding. Every trial or hearing could continue for an interminable length of time if courts and tribunals were required to receive formal proof of every assertion being made and were not allowed to make use of their ordinary experience to reach a decision. No one is required to provide evidence that Monday follows Sunday, that the sun rises in the east, or any of the other innumerable facts which are “generally known”.

The essential basis for taking judicial notice is that the fact involved is of a class that is so generally known as to give rise to the presumption that all reasonably informed persons are aware of it. This analysis excludes from judicial notice “particular” facts not generally known (in other words, facts known to people who have some special knowledge gained through their work or travel, for example, but which are not known by the general public).

No universal line can be drawn distinguishing between the generally known and particular facts. As a general guideline, the more central to the question in dispute a matter is, the greater the need is for proof to be made at the trial or hearing.^{Footnote 337}

The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the threshold for judicial notice is strict. A court or tribunal may take judicial notice—that is, accept a statement as true without formal proof—where the statement (a) would be considered as common knowledge without dispute among reasonable people, or (b) is capable of being shown to be true by reference to a readily accessible source of indisputable accuracy.^{Footnote 338}

Situations in which courts have taken judicial notice include local conditions (for example, time of sunset in the summer), geographic facts (for example, location of Canada-U.S. border), the existence and transmission of the virus that causes COVID-19,^{Footnote 339} and the overincarceration of indigenous offenders in Canada.^{Footnote 340} Judicial notice can be taken of Canadian laws, including all federal and provincial statutes and regulations. Norms of customary international law are also the proper subject of judicial notice.^{Footnote 341} However courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws.^{Footnote 342} The validity or existence of any foreign law must be established in evidence like any other fact to be proved.^{Footnote 343}

The IRPA specifically provides that the RPD and RAD “may take notice of any facts that may be judicially noticed ….”^{Footnote 344} Even absent similar provisions with respect to the ID and IAD, those divisions may also rely on judicial notice to establish obvious matters.

The divisions are not required to give notice to the parties before relying on judicial notice, unlike specialized knowledge (see 10.2 below). This is because of the very nature of the matters of which judicial notice may be taken. Judicial notice should only be used for facts that are commonly known and are not in dispute.^{Footnote 345} For example, the Federal Court has held that it was not appropriate to take judicial notice of dangerous country conditions.^{Footnote 346} Furthermore, if the source of the information is unknown, it is difficult to establish that the information is common knowledge.^{Footnote 347}

The Federal Court has found the RPD reasonably took judicial notice of the following:

the fact that a claimant's son would be cared for by children's welfare agencies if he were left in Canada^{Footnote 348}
anomalies on a birth certificate, including the lack of a stamp^{Footnote 349}
a decision in a judicial proceeding involving the same parties^{Footnote 350}

Conversely, the court has found that judicial notice was improperly taken of the following:

the Belgian refugee claimant process^{Footnote 351}
the investigation of a person's background that occurred before a passport was issued in Turkey^{Footnote 352}
police powers under the Bangladesh Special Powers Act^{Footnote 353}
the norms of diplomatic life, particularly those of the wife of an Ethiopian diplomat^{Footnote 354}
the role that grandparents play in the lives of their grandchildren or their physical infirmities^{Footnote 355}
the fact that a claimant is potentially subject to being discovered by agents of persecution through social media^{Footnote 356}

10.2 Specialized knowledge

The IRPA provides that in addition to having authority to take judicial notice of facts, the RPD and RAD may take notice of “any other generally recognized facts and any information or opinion that is within its specialized knowledge.”^{Footnote 357} This special power has not been given to the other 2 divisions.

Rule 22 of the RPD Rules provides:

Before using any information or opinion that is within its specialized knowledge, the division must notify the claimant or protected person, and the Minister if the Minister is present at the hearing, and give them a chance to
make representations on the reliability and use of the information or opinion; and
give evidence in support of their representations.

Rule 24 of the RAD Rules imposes similar requirements.

The power to take notice of facts, information and opinions within a division's specialized knowledge must be exercised fairly,^{Footnote 358} in accordance with the legislative parameters.^{Footnote 359} The Federal Court appears to be more likely to uphold the use of specialized knowledge where the documentary evidence supports the panel's statement regarding the existence of certain facts or information.^{Footnote 360}

Specialized knowledge is knowledge accumulated over time as a result of a decision-maker's adjudicative functions, as opposed to knowledge obtained in a personal capacity.^{Footnote 361} The Federal Court of Appeal in Bula^{Footnote 362} characterized specialized knowledge as being specific information rather than general experience acquired in the exercise of the duties of an adjudicator. In contrast to judicial notice, specialized knowledge may be used when facts are in dispute. Unlike facts of which judicial notice may be taken, specialized knowledge involves information which would not necessarily be known to the parties in a particular case.

For example, in Merja,^{Footnote 363} the RPD had found an Albanian Legality Party membership card had been tampered with and gave it no weight because its dry seal did not form a complete circle over the applicant's photograph. The RPD had disclosed to the applicant its specialized knowledge that the dry seal on such membership cards should be applied over the photograph as a security feature. The Federal Court confirmed that the IRB can rely upon its own knowledge of what a document would normally look like and take note of particular features, such as security measures, when deciding whether a document is fraudulent.

Where the panel takes notice of matters within its specialized knowledge, the panel should still consider the weight to be given to that information in relation to the other evidence and in light of the representations made by counsel or the Minister's representative.

10.2.1 Notice requirement

A panel cannot rely on specialized knowledge without first disclosing it to the claimant. Failure to do so can result in a breach of natural justice. For example, in Nur,^{Footnote 364} the RPD was found to have erred in concluding that nationality is determined by the father as much as the clan in Djibouti. The Federal Court held that nationality is a matter of law and therefore cannot be within the IRB's specialized knowledge; any knowledge of ethnicity, which could constitute specialized knowledge, ought to have been disclosed to the claimant.

A panel is not required to provide notice of specialized knowledge before the hearing. The relevant rules do not provide time frames for the notice requirements, however, they do require that parties be able to adequately present their points of view.^{Footnote 365}

Generally, failure to give the claimant the required notice constitutes a breach of natural justice that may justify overturning the decision, unless there are other findings that would support the decision and a redetermination would result in the same outcome,^{Footnote 366} or the specialized knowledge relied upon was essentially not in dispute.^{Footnote 367} For example, the Federal Court upheld the RPD decision in Kabedi,^{Footnote 368} despite finding that the RPD had failed to notify the claimant of its specialized knowledge regarding the content of Union for Democracy and Social Progress membership cards, due to the remaining credibility findings.

In Agguini,^{Footnote 369} the Federal Court held that the former Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD) erred in relying upon specialized knowledge to find the claimant was not credible because, among other things, he had mentioned that none of his Islamic aggressors had beards. In addition, the court found the division erred by failing to give notice under section 68(5) of the Immigration Act of its intention to consider this fact.

In Appau,^{Footnote 370} the Federal Court doubted that the CRDD's “alleged knowledge of procedures at Swiss border points and procedures of Swissair … could be described as ‘generally recognized facts' or ‘information or opinion that is within its specialized knowledge.'” Even if it could be, the court found that the division had erred in not giving notice of its intention to rely on those facts, and by not giving the claimant an opportunity to make submissions.

However, in Tchaynikova,^{Footnote 371} the Federal Court - Trial Division found that the CRDD had not erred in making use of its specialized knowledge that false documents indicating Jewish identity were commonly available in the former Soviet Union without notifying the claimant. The division had put the claimant on notice at the outset that the hearing would focus on the claimant’s ethnicity and her credibility. The adverse finding on authenticity of the documents, and the claimant’s credibility, was based on all of the evidence, not just on the division’s specialized knowledge. In the view of the Court, the division “is not required to bring to a claimant's attention every reservation held or implausibility found in reflecting upon the [claimant's] testimony as a whole, before its decision is made.”

In contrast, in Torishta,^{Footnote 372} the panel found that a letter provided from the claimant was inauthentic, based solely on specialized knowledge that obtaining such letters is easy in Albania. The court found that it was unreasonable for the panel to make this finding without giving the claimant an opportunity to respond, and that the finding constituted a breach of procedural fairness.

The division must give notice of the specific knowledge at issue. In Habiboglu,^{Footnote 373} the panel stated that it had specialized knowledge of Islam, however it did not specifically disclose knowledge regarding Caliphs in Turkey. The court found that the applicant was denied an opportunity to make representations on the reliability and use of the information and to give evidence in support of his representations, which constituted a breach of natural justice.

The applicable level of procedural fairness does not reach the level of disclosure found in criminal law. The relevant rules only specify that a party be afforded an opportunity to make representations and to provide evidence in line with the representations. In Toma,^{Footnote 374} the IRB was found to have provided sufficient notice of its specialized knowledge since the overall context, including its extensive questioning about the impugned evidence, suggested that the specialized knowledge was based on a Response to Information Request.

10.2.2 Specialized knowledge must be specific and verifiable

A member who declares specialized knowledge must place on the record sufficient detail of the knowledge to allow it to be tested.^{Footnote 375}

In Isakova,^{Footnote 376} the IRB cited specialized knowledge of police reports in the former Soviet Union, finding it unreasonable that the applicant did not produce one because it would have been available. The Federal Court held that the basis for the specialized knowledge must be “quantifiable and verifiable” and that reliance on past experience, absent specific details, prevents the applicant from being able to test the reliability of such knowledge.

Similarly, in Cortes,^{Footnote 377} the panel rejected the applicant's explanation that he had been told that it would be useless to file a complaint with the police unless he was injured. The panel claimed to have specialized knowledge of other uninjured claimants in Mexico having filed complaints. The Federal Court held that since this knowledge was neither quantifiable nor verifiable, Rule 22 could not be relied upon.

10.2.3 Reliance on findings from previous cases

The Federal Court - Trial Division held that the CRDD could take notice of an expert opinion in a “lead case” and consider it in a subsequent case, as an exercise of its authority to take notice of facts, information and opinions within its specialized knowledge, provided it gives proper notice. Accordingly, a claimant has a “right to comment on the evidence in lead cases, make comments on the appropriate weight to be given to this evidence, and submit his or her own evidence.”^{Footnote 378} However, the IRB cannot import a finding of fact from a previous case without first providing notice to the claimant.^{Footnote 379}

In Danyi,^{Footnote 380} the RPD discounted a psychological report due to the member's previous experiences with the psychologist in question, noting that the panel “has historically assigned very limited weight to this doctor's reports.” The Federal Court held that because the member had used information from sources external to the proceeding, the applicant had been deprived of an opportunity to respond to the evidence under Rule 22. This amounted to a breach of procedural fairness.

10.2.4 Information not considered to be specialized knowledge

Findings based on rationality and common sense are not considered to be based on specialized knowledge and do not require notice. For example, in Juma,^{Footnote 381} the RPD held it was reasonable to expect that if the Palestinian Authority suspected the claimant of posing a risk, they would not have reissued him a document to return. The Federal Court found that this reasoning relied on rationality and common sense as opposed to specialized knowledge.

In Mama,^{Footnote 382} a CRDD panel was found to have erred in relying on its many years of personal experience travelling through Europe to determine the claimant's credibility in relation to the ease with which he claimed to have travelled through Europe. The Federal Court – Trial Division found that the panel's personal experience, the full extent of which was unclear, did not qualify as specialized knowledge.

The majority of the jurisprudence has held that current National Documentation Packages are not specialized knowledge and that they are to be treated and relied upon in the same manner as other documentary evidence.^{Footnote 383}

Footnotes

Footnote 336

R. v. Spence, 2005 SCC 71, [2005] 3 SCR 458 (CanLII). Also see R. v. Potts, 1982 CanLII 1751 (ONCA).

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Footnote 337

R. v. Spence, 2005 SCC 71, [2005] 3 SCR 458, paragraph 60 (CanLII).

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Footnote 338

R. v. Find, 2001 SCC 32, [2001] 1 SCR 863, paragraph 48 (CanLII). Also see Smith v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1194, paragraph 56 (CanLII); Yeganeh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 714, paragraph 46 (CanLII).

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Footnote 339

R. v. Barry Matthews, 2020 ONSC 5459, paragraph 51 (CanLII) .

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Footnote 340

R. v. Sharma, 2020 ONCA 478, paragraph 102 (CanLII) .

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Footnote 341

Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5, [2020] 1 SCR 166, paragraphs 96–98(CanLII). Note that customary international law is different from treaty law. The Federal Court of Appeal has held that both customary international law and treaties that have been ratified and implemented in Canadian law are the subject of judicial notice in International Air Transport Association v. Canadian Transportation Agency, 2022 FCA 211, paragraph 64 (CanLII). However, in International Air Transport Association v. Canada (Transportation Agency), 2024 SCC 30, paragraphs 74–79 (CanLII), the Supreme Court of Canada clarified that there are circumstances where judges will be assisted in carrying out their functions by expert evidence with respect to international law, such as where the question of international law requires the judge to have regard to questions of fact that are susceptible to proof by expert evidence (e.g. state practice in a treaty's application).

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Footnote 342

Sayer v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 144, paragraph 4 (CanLII).

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Footnote 343

See Chapter 9 of this paper for a more extensive discussion of foreign laws.

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Footnote 344

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, paragraphs 170(i) and 171(b).

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Footnote 345

Maslej v. Canada (Minister of Manpower and Immigration), 1976 CanLII 2309 (FCA), [1977] 1 FC 194 (CA): Not all members of a minority group were in danger of being persecuted; Amiri, Hashmat v. MCI, 2001 FCT 62 (CanLII): Dari was not spoken solely in Afghanistan. Also see Gonzalez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1981] 2 FC 781 (CA), where the Immigration Appeal Board was overturned for improperly taking notice of information it had obtained in other hearings relating to Chile. The Federal Court of Appeal held that the information was not the type of information of which judicial notice could be taken in proceedings before a court nor was it of the general character well known to the Board and to the public referred to in the Maslej case. Also see Lawal v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 964 (CanLII), where the court held that an applicant’s assertion that they risked having their location discovered by their agents of persecution through their use of social media was not grounded in the evidence and was not a fact that the RAD should have recognized by judicial notice, particularly since the applicants did not raise any issue regarding social media before the RPD or the RAD.

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Footnote 346

Kaur v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1612, paragraph 12 (CanLII); Ruiz Castro v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 1282, paragraphs 28–29 (CanLII).

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Footnote 347

Lovera v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 786, paragraph 46 (CanLII).

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Footnote 348

Zheng v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 181, paragraph 35 (CanLII).

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Footnote 349

Umba v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 25, paragraphs 40–41 (CanLII).

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Footnote 350

Kovac v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 497, paragraph 10 (CanLII).

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Footnote 351

Nambazisa v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 617, paragraph 30 (CanLII).

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Footnote 352

Oymak v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1243 (CanLII).

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Footnote 353

Rahman v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 974, paragraph 69 (CanLII).

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Footnote 354

Keleta v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 56, paragraph 24 (CanLII).

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Footnote 355

Syed v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 398, paragraphs 33–35 (CanLII).

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Footnote 356

Lawal v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 964, paragraph 19 (CanLII).

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Footnote 357

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, paragraphs 170(i), 171(b).

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Footnote 358

In Pamuk v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1187 (CanLII), the RPD referred to an “on-going” case between the Alevi organization and the Turkish State, but it did not identify which case or conflict it was referring to when it put this issue to the claimant. It then relied on the claimant’s lack of knowledge about this “case” as a reason to doubt her membership in the Alevi organization. The Federal Court held that the RPD did not comply with Rule 18 (now Rule 22) before using its specialized knowledge, in that it did not give the claimant sufficient notice.

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Footnote 359

Sivaguru, Jegathas v. MEI (FCA, no. A-66-91), Heald, Hugessen, Stone, January 27, 1992. In Hussain v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 15956 (FC), the Federal Court – Trial Division held that there was no requirement that notice under section 68(5) of the Immigration Act be given at the outset of the hearing; compliance with that provision during the hearing was sufficient. (The Convention Refugee Determination Division advised the claimant of its concerns about his statements regarding Shi’ite principles and rituals.)

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Footnote 360

Ahamadon v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 15373 (FC); Nadarajalingam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 444 (CanLII). In Afzal v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 17147 (FC), [2000] 4 FC 708, the Federal Court – Trial Division held that the circumstances in which “first information reports” (FIRs) are available in Pakistan is not a matter of the Convention Refugee Determination Division’s specialized knowledge; that is why evidence was sought on the point by the panel itself. In Onudukan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1242, paragraph 30 (CanLII), the Court was not persuaded that the RAD could rely on its specialized knowledge when assessing documents from a particular country in the absence of any objective support for such specialized knowledge.

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Footnote 361

Mama, Salissou v. MEI (FCTD, no. A-1454-92), Teitelbaum, October 17, 1994, aff’d: Mama v. Canada (Employment and Immigration), 1997 CanLII 16757 (FCA); Appau v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] FCJ No. 300; Adefule v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1227, paragraph 21 (CanLII).

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Footnote 362

Bula v. Canada (Secretary of State), Federal Court (Appeal Division), Doc. A-329-94, Marceau, Hugessen, MacGuigan, June 19, 1996, paragraph 3.

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Footnote 363

Merja v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 73, paragraphs 44–45 (CanLII).

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Footnote 364

Nur v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 636, paragraphs 26–27 (CanLII). In Saghiri v. Canada (Minister of Citizen and Immigration), 2023 FC 720, paragraphs 36–37 (CanLII), the Court found the RAD breached procedural fairness by failing to give the parties notice and an opportunity to make written submissions before making any findings about exclusion. The Court held that whether the RPD had erred by failing to undertake an analysis under section 98 of IRPA falls within the RAD’s specialized knowledge of the law applicable to refugee claims, thus compliance with Rule 24 of the Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257 was required before dealing with the exclusion issue.

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Footnote 365

Munir v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 645 (CanLII). In Gabane v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 735, paragraph 16 (CanLII) the Court held that while the claimant did not have much time at the hearing to respond to the panel’s revelation that it was going to rely on specialized knowledge, he was given some notice and an opportunity to respond. Furthermore, there was nothing preventing him from requesting an opportunity to provide post-hearing submissions, and he did not.

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Footnote 366

See, for example, N'Sungani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1759 (CanLII); Keleta v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 56 (CanLII); Habiboglu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),2005 FC 1664 (CanLII); Tchaynikova v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 1997 CanLII 5174 (FC).

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Footnote 367

Bitala v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 470 (CanLII).

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Footnote 368

Kabedi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 442, paragraphs 14–17 (CanLII).

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Footnote 369

Agguini v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 8789 (FC).

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Footnote 370

Appau, Samuel v. MEI (FCTD, no. A-623-92), Gibson, February 24, 1995. This case was distinguished in Kanvathipillai v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 881 (CanLII), where the court upheld the CRDD’s use of specialized knowledge about U.S. immigration procedures, as it would be reasonable for board members to have acquired some familiarity with the US immigration system, given the amount of traffic across its common border with Canada.

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Footnote 371

Tchaynikova v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 1997 CanLII 5174 (FC).

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Footnote 372

Torishta v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 362, paragraphs 10–13 (CanLII).

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Footnote 373

Habiboglu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),2005 FC 1664, paragraph 29 (CanLII).

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Footnote 374

Toma v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 121 (CanLII).

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Footnote 375

Isakova v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 149 (CanLII); Hernandez Cortes v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 583 (CanLII); Lipdjio v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 28 (CanLII); I.P.P. v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 123, paragraphs 217–219 (CanLII). In Razburgaj v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 151 (CanLII), the Federal Court rejected the applicant’s argument that the IRB’s specialized knowledge was so unquantifiable and unverifiable that it was impossible to respond. To the contrary, the specialized knowledge disclosed was “specific and precise” (paragraphs 19–20).

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Footnote 376

Isakova v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 149, paragraph 35 (CanLII).

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Footnote 377

Hernandez Cortes v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 583, paragraph 36 (CanLII). Also see Lipdjio v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 28, paragraph 18 (CanLII).

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Footnote 378

Horvath v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 583, paragraph 7 (CanLII).

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Footnote 379

Smith v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1194, paragraphs 55–64 (CanLII): The RPD found that 94 percent of U.S. military deserters are dealt with administratively based on a finding made by a previous panel. The Federal Court held that such a finding of fact cannot be the subject of “judicial notice” and no notice was given of the use of specialized knowledge. Furthermore, importing this finding of fact was “clearly not acceptable” because a finding of fact must be based on the evidence submitted to the decision maker.

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Footnote 380

Danyi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1113, paragraph 10 (CanLII).

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Footnote 381

Juma v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 844, paragraphs 28–32 (CanLII). In Munyandamusa v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 12, paragraphs 29–35 (CanLII), theRAD found that simply examining the placement of a seal on a document does not fall under a decision-maker’s specialized knowledge. The Federal Court held that it was reasonable for the RAD to note the irregularities in the document and that since the entire analysis stemmed from the intrinsic evidence submitted by the applicant in support of her refugee claim, no issue of procedural fairness came into play and section 24 of the Rules did not apply. In Espitia Amador v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 339, paragraph 26 (CanLII), the RPD noted irregularities with regard to the use of the word “Ciudad” in the letterhead of certain documents. The Federal Court held that the irregularities in the use of the word “Ciudad” did not raise a specialized knowledge issue but rather an issue of probative value and of weight to be granted to the documents.

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Footnote 382

Mama, Salissou v. MEI (FCTD, no. A-1454-92), Teitelbaum, October 17, 1994, paragraph 22 aff’d: Mama v. Canada (Employment and Immigration), 1997 CanLII 16757 (FCA).

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Footnote 383

Linares Morales v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1496, paragraph 16 (CanLII), where the court held that the provisions governing procedures for disclosing specialized knowledge did not apply to documents adduced into evidence through the National Documentation Package. Similarly, in Berhani v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1007, paragraph 57 (CanLII), the court was of the view that the RAD was not improperly relying on undisclosed specialized knowledge when making its finding of ongoing judicial corruption in Albania. The RAD’s reasons referenced the section of the National Documentation Package for Albania to support its finding of widespread corruption, thus no breach of natural justice arose by failing to comply with the provision governing disclosure of specialized knowledge. Also see Adefule v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1227, paragraphs 21–22 (CanLII) where the court, citing Berhani, expressed a similar view; Pal v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 701, paragraph 19 (CanLII). However, in Magonza v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 14 (CanLII), a judicial review of a PRRA application, which precedes both the Berhani and Adefule decisions, the court held that the National Documentation Package is better viewed as containing generally recognized facts or specialized knowledge (paragraph 81).

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