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6 July 2026

SEN202608.E

Senegal: Political situation since the March 2024 presidential election, including that of the ruling party, the African Patriots of Senegal for Work, Ethics, and Fraternity (Patriotes africains du Sénégal pour le travail, l'éthique et la fraternité, PASTEF); treatment of opposition members and supporters by the authorities; treatment of PASTEF members and supporters by the opposition and the authorities; the amnesty law adopted on 6 March 2024, including its implementation; activities of nervis [thugs] since the change of government (2024–June 2026)

Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. Political Situation

1.1. Period Preceding the March 2024 Presidential Election

Agence France-Presse (AFP) and Reuters note that Ousmane Sonko founded the PASTEF party in 2014 (2026-06-02). The Presidency of Senegal website notes that Bassirou Diomaye Diakhar Faye co-founded PASTEF and served as its Secretary General from 2022 and 2024 (Senegal n.d.).

Sources state that between 2012 and 2024, the President of Senegal was Macky Sall (Political Handbook of the World 2025, 3, 14, 29; Bertelsman Stiftung 2026, 3) of the Alliance for the Republic-Hope (Alliance pour le République-Yaakar, APR-Yakkar; APR) party (Political Handbook of the World 2025, 14).

Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) 2026, which "assesses the transformation toward democracy and a market economy as well as the quality of governance in 137 countries," notes that "political tension rose substantially" towards the end of President Sall's second term, "mainly" due to his "heavy-handed approach towards his adversaries," particularly towards Sonko and PASTEF (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2026, 2, 3). Sources indicate that there were "[w]idespread" protests in 2021, following the arrest of Sonko on rape charges, and again in 2023 following Sonko's conviction on defamation charges (Political Handbook of the World 2025, 25, 26; Freedom House 2025-02-26, Sec. B2). Sources note that 65 people were killed during ["pro-Sonko" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2026, 10)] protests between 2021 and 2024 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2026, 10; Amnesty International 2026-04-21, 316). According to France's Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides, OFPRA), several individuals [translation] "close" to the [Sall] administration were accused of the protesters' deaths, including through the use of armed nervis (France 2025-12-03, 3). Citing an Amnesty International researcher, the Associated Press (AP) notes that individuals "believed to be part of the recruited 'nervis'," which are "gunmen for hire who are deployed to shut down protests," were seen outside the headquarters of the APR in Dakar (2023-06-16).

Sources indicate that Sonko was prevented from running in the 2024 presidential election due to his conviction (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2026, 3; Freedom House 2025-02-26, Sec. A1). Sources state that Faye was eligible to run in the election as he was jailed for criticizing Sonko's trial but not convicted (Resnick 2026-06-09; Bertelsmann Stiftung 2026, 4), leading PASTEF to select Faye as the party's presidential candidate (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2026, 3−4).

Sources notes that President Sall tried to cancel (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2026, 4) or postpone (Freedom House 2025-02-26, Sec. A1) the presidential election in February 2024, but was blocked by the Constitutional Court; subsequently, the election was set for March 2024 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2026, 4; Freedom House 2025-02-26, Sec. A1). Freedom House indicates that Sonko and Faye were released from jail following the passing of the amnesty law [see section 5 of this Response] in early March 2024 (2025-02-26, Sec. A1).

1.2. March 2024 Presidential Election

The Political Handbook of the World 2024-2025 states that Faye won the presidential election held in March 2024 and appointed Sonko as prime minister (2025, 25−26). Sources report that Faye won approximately 54% of the vote in the March 2024 presidential election (AFP 2024-03-27; Al Jazeera 2024-03-29; Reuters 2024-03-27). Faye was inaugurated as president of Senegal on 2 April 2024 (AP 2024-04-02; Reuters 2024-04-02; Senegal n.d.).

1.3. November 2024 Legislative Election

The Handbook notes that "growing tensions with parliament prompted Faye to suspend the legislature and call for snap elections in late November [2024]" (Political Handbook of the World 2025, 26). Radio France internationale (RFI) indicates that according to Faye, members of parliament (MPs) refused to discuss the budget law and efforts to "dissolve wasteful state institutions" (2024-09-13). The same source reports that in September 2024 Faye dissolved parliament and called for elections to be held in November 2024 (RFI 2024-09-13). Sources report that President Faye's PASTEF party won 130 out of 165 seats in the legislative election held in November 2024 (AP 2024-11-21; DW 2024-11-28).

According to sources, in May 2026 President Faye dismissed Sonko as Prime Minister, as well as all ministers, and dissolved the government (Al Jazeera & Reuters 2026-05-23; France 24 with AFP 2026-05-23; RFI 2026-05-23). The BBC notes that the relationship between Faye and Sonko had been "deteriorating for months," with Sonko "openly criticizing" Faye's approach to the country's debt problems (2026-05-26). Sources note that following Sonko's resignation, the speaker of the parliament El Malick Ndiaye resigned (Al Jazeera & AFP 2026-05-24; BBC 2026-05-25), allowing Sonko to run for the position (Al Jazeera & AFP 2026-05-24). Sources report that on 25 May 2026, Faye appointed Ahmadou Al Aminou Lo, a former executive at the Central Bank of West African States, as prime minister, replacing Sonko (Le Monde with AFP 2026-05-26; Reuters 2026-05-25). Sources indicate that on 26 May 2026, Sonko was elected as the parliamentary speaker (AFP & Reuters 2026-05-26; BBC 2026-05-26). According to sources, a new government was announced on 1 June 2026, but Sonko stated that his party, the ruling PASTEF party, would not participate in the new government (AFP & Reuters 2026-06-02; AP 2026-06-02).

1.4. Period Following the Split Between Faye and Sonko, Including the Diomaye Président Coalition

According to Deutsche Welle (DW), Germany's public international broadcaster, Faye is [translation] "working to distance himself" from PASTEF (2026-05-11). RFI indicates that the Diomaye Président Coalition, which was originally created to gain support for Faye in the 2024 election, was repositioned to support the actions of Faye as president and launched a think tank to advise Faye on strategy (2026-04-03). According to Jeune Afrique, in April 2026 government officials with ties to PASTEF were replaced, including an [translation] "influential" PASTEF member who was replaced by a former coordinator of the Diomaye Président Coalition think tank as the minister-counselor and spokesperson of the president (2026-05-06). A June 2026 Reuters article notes that while Faye remains a member of PASTEF, he no longer holds "any official role" in the party (2026-06-29).

RFI notes that in May 2026, [translation] "hundreds" of PASTEF supporters marched in support of Sonko's candidacy as president for the 2029 election just a week after a Diomaye Président Coalition rally took place (2026-05-18). Sources indicate that Sonko remains popular with PASTEF supporters and with young people (BBC 2026-05-26; Resnick 2026-06-09).

According to France 24 with AFP, on 29 June 2026, the parliament passed a constitutional amendment bill that would strengthen the power of the parliament and the prime minister with an "overwhelming majority," leading President Faye to call for a referendum on the matter; "all" opposition MPs except for one walked out in protest (2026-06-29). Reuters notes that the amendment was spearheaded by PASTEF and includes a provision that would bar a sitting president from serving as leader of a political party (2026-06-29). France 24 with AFP indicates that PASTEF describes the bill as an attempt to "'better rebalanc[e] … powers'," while the president of the Diomaye Président Coalition said it was being used to "'weaken the president'" (2026-06-29).

2. Treatment of Opposition Members and Supporters by the Authorities

OFPRA notes that a government report published following President Faye taking power announced [translation] "significant irregularities" in public finances between 2019 and March 2024, leading to investigations against those accused to be responsible, including former ministers and government officials (France 2025-12-03, 3). AFP notes that since taking office, Faye's government has pledged to "pursue" politicians associated with the former Sall administration over allegations of "widespread financial mismanagement" (2025-07-30). Le Monde with AFP adds that "a number of former officials" have been prevented from travelling abroad (2024-09-27). Another article by Le Monde with AFP indicates that following an investigation carried out by the Financial Judicial Pool (Pool judiciaire financier, PJF) between September 2024 and April 2025, [translation] "more than" 250 people have been arrested, and in a separate investigation into the management of a fund for the COVID-19 response in 2020 and 2021, the public prosecutor for Dakar announced that 27 individuals were questioned and 26 were released on bail, with 1 taken into custody (2025-04-18). Sources indicate that 5 former officials from the Sall government, including the ministers of community development, industrial development, and mines, are facing charges of embezzlement (RFI 2025-05-27; Africanews 2025-05-27). Other sources note that the former minister of sports, who has been in pre-trial detention since 2024 for embezzlement, was released on bail in November 2025 by the Supreme Court, following an unsuccessful appeal by the prosecutor (Jeune Afrique 2025-11-07; Le Quotidien 2025-11-07).

The Point, a newspaper in the Gambia (The Point n.d.), notes that at a rally in November 2025, Sonko blamed Senegal's debt crisis on Sall and the APR, calling the APR a "'criminal organization'" that should be dissolved and vowed to prosecute Sall for "high treason" (2025-11-10). RFI states that while Sall's allies describe the corruption cases as the government "persecuting their political enemies," Faye and Sonko assert that the judiciary is independent (2025-05-27). BTI 2026 indicates that while corruption allegations against politicians are "common," efforts to prosecute remain "controversial" as they tend to focus on the opposition or members of the former ruling party (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2026, 12). Citing information provided by 2 political scientists in a December 2025 report, OFPRA notes that incidents of [translation] "tension or intimidation" are "rare and localized and are generally linked to specific political rivalries, local dynamics or personal conflicts" and there is no "pattern of systematic or widespread repression" (France 2025-12-03, 5). One of the political scientists stated to OFPRA that [translation] "increasing autonomy" can be observed in the judiciary in "recent" months, even in "sensitive and high-profile cases" (France 2025-12-03, 5).

BTI 2026 notes that opposition parties and their candidates have been "hampered in some cases," including Karim Wade, the son of a former president, who was not allowed to run in the 2024 presidential election due to his dual citizenship (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2026, 9). Freedom House similarly indicates that a "number of" opposition figures were excluded from competing in the 2024 election "due to criminal cases or accusations of dual citizenship" (2025-02-26, Sec. A1).

In its report on events in 2025, Amnesty International states that in June 2025, "former MP and opposition leader Moustapha Diakhaté was arrested after a televised appearance and accused of insulting the head of state"; he was convicted in July 2025, sentenced to 2 months in prison, and released upon completion of his sentence (2026-04-21, 315−316). AFP notes that Diakhaté's arrest came after he referred to the government leadership as "'scoundrels'" (2025-07-30). The political scientists interviewed by OFPRA noted that there is no [translation] "systematic persecution" of APR members, whether due to their social media statements or past political involvement (France 2025-12-03, 5). One of the political scientists interviewed by OFPRA stated that there has been an increase of actors who present themselves as political commentators or journalists, but who use their platform for [translation] "insults or defamation" against members of the executive branch of government, leading to legal proceedings (France 2025-12-03, 4−5).

3. Treatment PASTEF Members and Supporters by the Opposition

Information on the treatment of PASTEF members and supporters by the opposition was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

France 24 with AFP indicates that when parliament passed the constitutional amendment to strengthen the powers of the prime minister and the parliament backed by PASTEF, "around" 50 protesters, "mostly" APR supporters, gathered outside the National Assembly and attempted to storm parliament, but were repelled by security forces (2026-06-29).

4. Treatment of PASTEF Members and Supporters by Authorities

Information on the treatment of PASTEF members and supporters by authorities was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

Amnesty International notes that in October 2025, 2 PASTEF supporters "were convicted and sentenced to one month in prison for indecent speech after they published social media videos in which they insulted opponents of the prime minister" (2026-04-21, 315−316). Senegalese media sources indicate that these individuals made social media posts that included threats of castration (iGFM 2025-10-20; Senego 2025-10-15) of opposition protesters (Senego 2025-10-15). iGFM, a Senegal-based online news site, states that the court handed down [translation] "a more lenient sentence" of 1 month's imprisonment (iGFM 2025-10-20). Sources note that an entrepreneur and the administrator of the Libasse TV social media account, [who is also a member of the PASTEF party (Seneweb 2026-03-06)], was arrested in March 2026 for insulting President Faye in a social media livestream (Xalima.com 2026-03-11; Seneweb 2026-03-06). Seneweb, an online news site, adds that another PASTEF supporter was arrested for "similar acts" (Seneweb 2026-03-06).

5. Amnesty Law

Amnesty International notes that on 28 February 2024, the National Assembly passed an amnesty law, covering "offences linked to 'protests or politically motivated incidents that took place between 1 February 2021 and 25 February 2024, in Senegal or abroad'," preventing legal proceedings by families of individuals who were killed, the "majority" by security forces, during the 2021−2024 protests (2025-04-28, 316).

Law No. 2024-09 of 13 March 2024 on Amnesty (Loi n° 2024-09 du 13 mars 2024 portant amnistie) provides the following:

[translation]

Article 1. Amnesty is granted ipso jure for all acts likely to be classified as criminal or correctional offences, committed between 1 February 2021 and 25 February 2024, both in Senegal and abroad, relating to demonstrations or having political motivations, including those made through all communication media, whether or not the perpetrators have been tried.

Article 2. Amnesty entails, without ever giving rise to restitution, the total remission of all principal, accessory and complementary penalties, as well as the removal of all disqualifications, exclusions, incapacities and deprivations of rights attached to the penalty.

Article 3. The amnesty is without prejudice to the rights of third parties. Imprisonment for debt may not be exercised against convicts who have benefited from amnesty, except at the request of the victims of the offence or their beneficiaries.

Article 4. Disputes relating to the application of the present amnesty law are judged by the Indictment Division of the Dakar Court of Appeal, under the conditions set out in article 735 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Article 5. It is forbidden for any magistrate or civil servant to recall or allow to remain in any form whatsoever in a judicial or police file or in any official document, the convictions, disqualifications, exclusions, incapacities and deprivations of rights attached to the sentence erased by the amnesty, except as provided for in article 3 of the present law.

However, minutes of judgments or rulings as well as decrees, orders and decisions made in the context of the civil service or national orders are exempt from this prohibition when they have been deposited in the registries or National Archives.

This law shall be enforced as a law of the State. (Senegal 2024)

Reuters reports that in early April 2025, Senegal's parliament approved revisions to the amnesty law, "paving the way for possible prosecutions over the deaths of dozens of protesters" (2025-04-03). The same source notes, that while the revisions does not repeal the law, it "removes amnesty for specific crimes including murder, torture and forced disappearance" (Reuters 2025-04-03). However, sources report that in mid-April 2025 the Constitutional Court overturned the revised amnesty law, stating that it was contrary to the constitution (DW 2025-04-24; Le Monde with AFP 2025-04-24). Amnesty International states that in April 2025, the Constitutional Court decided that the amnesty law "would not impede the prosecution of killings and torture committed between February 2021 and February 2024" (2026-04-21, 316). Reuters states that both the ruling party and the opposition welcomed the ruling; the opposition was concerned that the revised law would protect protesters whom they accuse of "looting and stoking violence," while the ruling party sees the decision as confirming that complaints for "serious crimes" can be filed (2025-04-24).

Sources indicate that a judicial investigation into the deaths that resulted from the 2021−2024 protests was initiated in July 2025 (Africanews & AP 2025-07-29; DW 2025-07-29), with the prosecutor aiming to decide whether charges are warranted against "civilians, law enforcement, or political leaders" (Africanews & AP 2025-07-29). Amnesty International indicates that "[s]everal persons of interest" were interviewed by the judiciary in October 2025 (2026-04-21, 316). Citing an interview with an unnamed political scientist and Amnesty International, OFPRA adds that [translation] "several" accused have left the country (France 2025-12-03, 3).

Further information on the implementation of the amnesty law could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

6. Activities of Nervis Since the Change of Government

Information on the activities of nervis since the change of government could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

References

Africanews. 2025-05-27. "Senegal Indicts Fifth Former Minister amid Intensifying Anti-Corruption Campaign." [Accessed 2026-06-29]

Africanews & Associated Press (AP). 2025-07-29. "Senegal Opens Official Probe into 2021-2024 Political Violence." [Accessed 2026-06-26]

Agence France-Presse (AFP). 2025-07-30. "Senegal Taking Government Critics 'Hostage': Defence Lawyer." [Accessed 2026-06-25]

Agence France-Presse (AFP). 2024-03-27. "Senegal Results Show Large Win for Opponent Faye in Presidential Poll." [Accessed 2026-05-29]

Agence France-Presse (AFP) & Reuters. 2026-06-02. "Senegal President Names Government, Boycotted by Ally-Turned-Rival." [Accessed 2026-06-23]

Agence France-Presse (AFP) & Reuters. 2026-05-26. "Senegal Lawmakers Elect Ousted PM Sonko as New Parliament Speaker." [Accessed 2026-06-03]

Al Jazeera. 2024-03-29. "Senegal's Top Court Confirms Bassirou Diomaye Faye's Election Victory." [Accessed 2026-05-29]

Al Jazeera & Agence France-Presse (AFP). 2026-05-24. "Senegal Parliament Speaker Steps Down as Political Crisis Worsens." [Accessed 2026-06-03]

Al Jazeera & Reuters. 2026-05-23. "Senegal's President Faye Sacks PM Sonko and Dissolves Government."[Accessed 2026-06-03]

Amnesty International. 2026-04-21. "Senegal." The State of the World's Human Rights: April 2026. [Accessed 2026-05-29]

Amnesty International. 2025-04-28. "Senegal." The State of the World's Human Rights: April 2025. [Accessed 2026-06-23]

Associated Press (AP). 2026-06-02. Mark Banchereau. "Senegal's Ousted PM Sonko Boycotts New Government, Raising Fears of Political Deadlock." [Accessed 2026-06-23]

Associated Press (AP). 2024-11-21. "Senegal's Ruling Party Wins Majority in Parliament, Paving Way for Reforms." [Accessed 2026-06-02]

Associated Press (AP). 2024-04-02. Jessica Donati & Babacar Dione. "Senegal Swears in Africa's Youngest Elected Leader as President in a Dramatic Prison-to-Palace Rise." [Accessed 2026-06-02]

Associated Press (AP). 2023-06-16. Sam Mednick. "Protesters in Senegal Accuse Police of Using Armed Civilians to Quell Unrest." [Accessed 2026-06-29]

Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2026. "Senegal Country Report." Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) 2026. [Accessed 2026-05-29]

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2026-05-26. Nicolas Negoce & Paul Njie. "Senegal's Sacked PM Sonko Elected Parliamentary Speaker in Challenge to President." [Accessed 2026-06-03]

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2026-05-25. Paul Njie. "Senegal's Leadership Row Mounts as Parliament Speaker Resigns." [Accessed 2026-06-03]

Deutsche Welle (DW). 2026-05-11. Bob Barry. "Diomaye Faye veut marquer ses distances avec le Pastef." [Accessed 2026-06-26]

Deutsche Welle (DW). 2025-07-29. Bob Barry. "Sénégal: une enquête ouverte sur les violences politiques." [Accessed 2026-06-26]

Deutsche Welle (DW). 2025-04-24. Robert Adé. "Au Sénégal, la justice invalide la loi d'amnistie." [Accessed 2026-06-24]

Deutsche Welle (DW). 2024-11-28. Martina Schwikowski. "Senegal's Top Court Confirms Ruling Party's Big Election Win." [Accessed 2026-06-03]

France. 2025-12-03. Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides (OFPRA). Sénégal : Ciblage présumé de membres de l'APR par les autorités. [Accessed 2026-06-25]

France 24 with Agence France-Presse (AFP). 2026-06-29. "Senegal President Faye to Call Referendum on Constitutional Reform Limiting His Powers." [Accessed 2026-06-29]

France 24 with Agence France-Presse (AFP). 2026-05-23. "Senegal's President Fires PM Sonko, Dissolves Government." <" [Accessed 2026-06-03]

Freedom House. 2025-02-26. "Senegal." Freedom in the World 2025. [Accessed 2026-06-23]

iGFM. 2025-10-20. "Justice: Lamignou Darou et Boy Daka condamnés à un mois de prison ferme." [Accessed 2026-06-26]

Jeune Afrique. 2026-05-06. Mehdi Ba. "Sénégal: dans l'entourage de Bassirou Diomaye Faye, des limogeages très politiques." [Accessed 2026-06-26]

Jeune Afrique. 2025-11-07. "Au Sénégal, l'ancien ministre Lat Diop remis en liberté provisoire, sous bracelet électronique." [Accessed 2026-06-29]

Le Monde with Agence France-Presse (AFP). 2025-04-24. "Au Sénégal, le Conseil constitutionnel invalide une loi du nouveau pouvoir révisant l'amnistie votée sous Macky Sall." [Accessed 2026-06-24]

Le Monde with Agence France-Presse (AFP). 2025-04-18. "Au Sénégal, plus de 250 personnes arrêtées dans le cadre de la 'reddition des comptes'." [Accessed 2026-06-29]

Le Monde with Agence France-Presse (AFP). 2024-09-27. "Senegal PM Vows 'Corruption' Probe into Former Government." [Accessed 2026-06-26]

Le Monde with Associated Press (AP). 2026-05-26. "Senegal Names Economist Lo as New PM After Sonko Ouster." [Accessed 2026-06-03]

The Point. 2025-11-10. "Prime Minister Sonko Vows to Prosecute Macky Sall." [Accessed 2026-06-29]

The Point. N.d. "About Us." [Accessed 2026-06-29]

Political Handbook of the World 2024-2025. 2025. "Senegal." Edited by Tom Lansford. Thousand Oaks: CQ Press. [Accessed 2026-06-16]

Le Quotidien. 2025-11-07. "Nouveaux rebondissements judiciaires : Lat Diop enfin libéré, Pape Malick Ndour tombe au Prodac." [Accessed 2026-06-29]

Radio France internationale (RFI). 2026-05-23. "Senegal President Sacks Prime Minister amid Mounting Power Struggle." [Accessed 2026-06-03]

Radio France internationale (RFI). 2026-05-18. "Sénégal: à Dakar, les partisans du Pastef mobilisés en soutien à Ousmane Sonko." [Accessed 2026-06-26]

Radio France internationale (RFI). 2026-04-03. "Sénégal: la coalition de soutien au président lance son think tank pour 'l'aider à réussir son mandat'." [Accessed 2026-06-26]

Radio France internationale. 2025-05-27. "Senegal Court Charges Fifth Former Minister Amadou Mansour Faye over Graft." [Accessed 2026-06-29]

Radio France internationale (RFI). 2024-09-13. "Senegal's President Dissolves Parliament, Calls Snap November Election." [Accessed 2026-06-02]

Resnick, Danielle. 2026-06-09. "A New Schism in Senegal Marks Uncharted Territory for Africa's Democratic Beacon." Brookings Institution. [Accessed 2026-06-26]

Reuters. 2026-06-29. "Senegal Police Fire Tear Gas at Constitutional Reform Protesters." [Accessed 2026-06-29]

Reuters. 2026-05-25. Diadie Ba, Ayen Deng Bior & Anait Miridzhanian. "Senegal's Faye Names Economist Lo as New Prime Minister." [Accessed 2026-06-03]

Reuters. 2025-04-24. "Senegal Top Court Reject Bid to Lift Amnesty for Protest Deaths." [Accessed 2026-06-26]

Reuters. 2025-04-03. "Senegal Lifts Amnesty for Some Offences During Deadly 2021-24 Protests." [Accessed 2026-06-23]

Reuters. 2024-04-02. Ngouda Dione. "Faye Sworn in as Senegal President, Cites 'Profound Desire for Change'." [Accessed 2026-06-02]

Reuters. 2024-03-27. "Senegal's Opposition Candidate Faye Won over 54% of Vote, Full Provisional Results Show." [Accessed 2026-05-29]

Senegal. 2024. Loi n° 2024-09 du 13 mars 2024 portant amnistie. Excerpt translated by the Translation Bureau, Public Services and Procurement Canada. [Accessed 2026-06-24]

Senegal. N.d. Présidence du Sénégal. "Biographie du Président Bassirou Diomaye Diakhar Faye." [Accessed 2026-06-02]

Senego. 2025-10-15. Faty BA. "'J'ai réagi sous le coup de la colère' : 6 mois de prison ferme requis contre deux militants de Pastef." [Accessed 2026-06-26]

Seneweb. 2026-03-06. Mor Mbaye Cissé. "Insult Against President Diomaye: A Pastef Activist Arrested by the Faidherbe BR." [Accessed 2026-06-26]

Xalima.com. 2026-03-11. "Offense au chef de l'État : l'administrateur de Libasse TV déféré, l'auteur du photomontage arrêté." [Accessed 2026-06-26]

Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Association des juristes sénégalaises; Commission nationale des droits de l'homme du Sénégal; Institut des droits de l'homme et de la paix; ONG 3D; Organisation nationale des droits de l'homme du Sénégal; Rencontre africaine pour la défense des droits de l'homme.

Internet sites, including: Africa Center for Strategic Studies; African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights; African Union; Agence de presse sénégalaise; Agence Ecofin; Austrian Red Cross – ecoi.net; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Commission nationale des droits de l'homme du Sénégal; Democracy in Africa; Factiva; Fédération internationale pour les droits humains; France – Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères; Germany – Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development; Human Rights Watch; Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques; International Crisis Group; International Foundation for Electoral Systems; International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance; Inter-Parliamentary Union; Journal of Democracy; The New York Times; Le Nouvel Obs; ONG 3D; Pan African News Agency; Patriotes africains du Sénégal pour le travail, l'éthique et la fraternité; The Punch; Radio Canada; Radiodiffusion télévision senegalaise; Sahara Media; SeneNews; Le Soleil; Sud Quotidien; UN – Human Rights Council, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Refworld; TV5Monde; UK – House of Commons Library; University of Minnesota – Human Rights Library; Wal Fadjri; World Bank.

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