China: Situation and treatment of Chinese citizens who protest their land expropriation at the local level (2017-December 2019)
Information on the situation and treatment of Chinese citizens who protest their land expropriation at the local level was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
1. Overview
In a telephone interview with the Research Directorate, an Associate Professor of Political Science [1] at the University of Toronto stated that land expropriation issues remained among the top three reasons for protests in China, but have declined over the last decade, due to China’s economic situation, slowing pace of construction and increased “cost to benefit perceived by Chinese citizens” (Associate Professor 27 Nov. 2019). The same source further stated that land expropriation protests tend to be small (approximately 20-30 people), with some consisting of approximately 100-200 people, and that they are generally isolated incidents given the local nature of the issue and “containment actions” taken by the Chinese government (Associate Professor 27 Nov. 2019). Similarly, Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2018, which provides country-by-country analysis of developments that relate to political and economic trends, states that most demonstrations against the government are small (approximately one dozen people) with land expropriation and house demolitions among the top issues (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018, 2, 27).
The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) stated in a 2018 report that “large numbers” of resettlement and land expropriation cases were reported in China (UN 19 Sept. 2018, para. 26). According to the US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018, thousands of people from rural areas were resettled (US 13 Mar. 2019, 20). Sources note that “low” (Freedom House 2018, Sec. G2) or “often insufficient” compensation is provided to displaced residents (UN 19 Sept. 2018, para. 26). The CERD report also indicates “that despite an official policy of voluntary resettlement, in practice informed consent is not consistently obtained” (UN 19 Sept. 2018, para. 26).
Sources indicate reports of corruption in property rights transfers in China (Freedom House 2018, Sec. G2; US 31 May 2017). A 2017 US Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) [2] report, based on several sources, indicates that land use corruption, including expropriations, is “rampant” at the local level throughout China (US 31 May 2017). US Country Reports 2018 states that displaced residents receive “little or no compensation” from property transactions due to “local officials’ collusion with property developers” (US 13 Mar. 2019, 20). The US 2019 Investment Climate Statement [3] on China reports on issues regarding land use rights, including “unclear ownership lines and disputed border claims, often at the expense of local farmers who are excluded from the process by village leaders making ‘handshake deals’ with commercial interests” (US 11 July 2019a).
According to sources, China’s central government extended a 2015 pilot program through 2018 aimed at reforming rural land use rights (ASPI and RHG May 2019; Reuters 12 Sept. 2017) to the benefit of rural residents (Reuters 12 Sept. 2017). US Country Reports 2018 indicates that problems with property transactions continued after claims by the Chinese government that progress on compensation standardization and increased controls on illegal land seizures had occurred (US 13 Mar. 2019, 20).
2. Legislation
Articles 10 and 13 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China provide the following:
Article 10. Ownership of land
Land in the cities is owned by the [S]tate.
Land in the rural and suburban areas is owned by collectives except for those portions which belong to the [S]tate in accordance with the law; house sites and privately farmed plots of cropland and hilly land are also owned by collectives.
The State may, in the public interest and in accordance with the provisions of the law, expropriate or requisition land for its use and shall make compensation for the land expropriated or requisitioned.
No organization or individual may appropriate, buy, sell or unlawfully transfer land in other ways. The right to the use of the land may be transferred in accordance with the law.
All organizations and individuals using land must ensure its rational use.
…
Article 13. Private property, inheritance
Citizens' lawful private property is inviolable. The State, in accordance with law, protects the rights of citizens to private property and to its inheritance. The State may, in the public interest and in accordance with law, expropriate or requisition private property for its use and shall make compensation for the private property expropriated or requisitioned. (China 1982)
Article 13 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Management of Urban Real Estate provides the following: “The maximum granting number of years for the land-use right shall be laid down by the State Council” (China 1995).
The Property Rights Law of the People's Republic of China states the following:
Article 42
For the purpose of public interest, the collectively-owned land, houses and other real property owned by institutes or individuals may be expropriated in line with the procedure and within the authority provided by laws.
For expropriation of collectively-owned land, such fees shall be paid as compensations for the land expropriated, subsidies for resettlement, compensations for the fixtures and the young crops on land, and the premiums for social security of the farmers whose land is expropriated shall be allocated in full, in order to guarantee their normal lives and safeguard their lawful rights and interests.
Where houses and other real properties of institutes and individuals are expropriated, compensations for demolition and resettlement shall be paid according to law in order to maintain the legal rights and interests of the expropriated; where individual residential house is expropriated, the residential conditions of the expropriated shall be guaranteed.
No institution or individual shall withhold, misappropriate, embezzle or privately divide the compensation for expropriation.
…
Article 117
The owner of the usufructuary right shall, within the extent permitted by law, enjoy the rights to possess, utilize and obtain profits from the real or movable properties owned by others.
…
Article 126
The contracted term of farmland shall be thirty years, thirty to fifty years for grassland and thirty to seventy years for forestland. The contracted term for forest land with special forests may be prolonged upon approval of the relevant competent forestry administration department of the State Council.
Where the contracted term provided in the preceding paragraph expires, the contractor of the right to land contractual management may continue the contract according to relevant provisions of the State. (China 2007)
Chinese state media reports that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council have issued a guideline that, after [the current 30 year term], contracts for farmland will be "'extended for another 30 years upon expiration'" (CGTN 26 Nov. 2019). Further information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
3. Treatment by Authorities of Chinese Citizens Who Protest Land Expropriation
3.1 Protesters
US Country Reports 2018 indicates that protests over forced relocations are common and that protest leaders are sometimes prosecuted (US 13 Mar. 2019, 20). Further and corroborating information, including information on the number of protesters prosecuted, could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
The UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights indicates that land expropriations are a “major” cause of social unrest and that “[t]hose who oppose expropriation, and their supporters such as lawyers and community leaders, are often subjected to verbal threats, intimidation, loss of basic services, dismissal from jobs, and the use of force and violence by local authorities” (UN 28 Mar. 2017, para. 48-49). The CECC report, based on several sources, similarly states that local governments use “threats, coercion, and violence” when dispossessing villagers of property (US 31 May 2017).
3.2 Petitioners
Article 41 of China’s constitution states the following:
Citizens of the People's Republic of China have the right to criticize and make suggestions regarding any state organ or functionary. Citizens have the right to make to relevant state organs complaints or charges against, or exposures of, any state organ or functionary for violation of the law or dereliction of duty, but fabrication or distortion of facts for purposes of libel or false incrimination is prohibited.
The state organ concerned must deal with complaints, charges or exposures made by citizens in a responsible manner after ascertaining the facts. No one may suppress such complaints, charges and exposures or retaliate against the citizens making them.
Citizens who have suffered losses as a result of infringement of their civic rights by any state organ or functionary have the right to compensation in accordance with the law. (China 1982)
Sources state that, while Chinese citizens have the right to petition the central government, local governments often interfered in the process (Associate Professor 27 Nov. 2019; US 13 Mar. 2019, 18). Sources report that Chinese citizens attempting to travel to Beijing to petition are often intercepted and returned to their villages (Freedom House 2019, Sec. G1; US 13 Mar. 2019, 18) by “security personnel” sent by local governments (US 13 Mar. 2019, 18). Other sources refer to “thugs” hired by local governments (Associate Professor 27 Nov. 2019; SCMP 6 Feb. 2013) to prevent petitioners from bringing complaints to the central government (SCMP 6 Feb. 2013).
Sources report that the outcome of these interceptions can result in a forcible return to the petitioners' home village or “extralega[l]” detention in facilities known as “black jails” (Freedom House 2019, Sec. G1; US 13 Mar. 2019, 18). Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) describes these black jails as
short-term detention in rented/owned, run down hotel rooms or similar, often used for petitioners, criminals and those under suspicion of less sensitive allegations, as a coercive measure. … black jails are quasi-administrative holding centres for petitioners and criminals. (Australia 3 Oct. 2019, para. 4.28)
US Country Reports 2018 indicates that petitioners’ detentions were often unrecorded and for a “brief” period of time (US 13 Mar. 2019, 18). According to the Associate Professor, detention periods were generally for less than a year (Associate Professor 27 Nov. 2019).
3.3 Family Members
The Associate Professor stated that the “greatest threat” used by both local governments and the central government is against protesters’ or petitioners’ “network” (essentially their family), as they threaten family members with “possible violence” or loss of their government job in order to influence protesters and petitioners (Associate Professor 27 Nov. 2019). The same source added that many long-term petitioners tend to be divorced due to the impact on family members (Associate Professor 27 Nov. 2019). Similarly, in a 2015 academic article that addresses land appropriation in China and the impact on families, the authors report the following:
When faced with homeowners who refuse to accept appropriation of their property, local authorities often use family ties to extend the state’s reach. To complete urban renewal, municipal demolition offices turn to resisters’ relatives who work for government bureaus, state-owned factories, schools and hospitals. Under pressure and the threat of sanctions, many work-unit members agree to pressure their relatives into signing demolition agreements, often by tapping into “feelings of affection” and emotional blackmail. Beyond emptying a neighborhood, “harmonious demolition” has many consequences: it can turn relatives against each other, lead to divorce, and produce disillusionment and anger. Although “demolition by implicating family members” was banned in 2010, it continues. (O’Brien and Deng July 2015, abstract)
Further information on a ban in 2010 could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.
Notes
[1] The Associate Professor's current research includes China’s treatment of citizens.
[2] The Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) is a US agency mandated to monitor the human rights situation in China in order “to authorize extension of non-discriminatory treatment (normal trade relations treatment)” and is composed of representatives of the US government (US 2000, title page, Sec. 302, 303).
[3] The US Department of State’s Investment Climate Statements are assessments provided by economic officers that include information on legal regimes, transparency, responsible business conduct and corruption among other topics to facilitate business decisions (US 11 July 2019b).
References
Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) and Rhodium Group (RHG). May 2019. China Dashboard Spring 2019. [Accessed 9 Dec. 2019]
Associate Professor, University of Toronto. 27 November 2019. Telephone interview with the Research Directorate.
Australia. 3 October 2019. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). DFAT Country Information Report: People’s Republic of China. [Accessed 28 Nov. 2019]
Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2018. “China Country Report.” Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2018. [Accessed 10 Dec. 2019]
China. 2007. Property Rights Law of the People's Republic of China. [Accessed 20 Nov. 2019]
China. 1995. Law of the People's Republic of China on Management of Urban Real Estate. [Accessed 20 Nov. 2019]
China. 1982 (amended 2004). Constitution of the People's Republic of China. [Accessed 20 Nov. 2019]
China Global Television Network (CGTN). 26 November 2019. “China Issues Guideline to Keep Land Contracting Practices 'Unchanged'.” [Accessed 3 Jan. 2020]
Freedom House. 2019. “China.” Freedom in the World 2019. [Accessed 28 Nov. 2019]
Freedom House. 2018. “China.” Freedom in the World 2018. [Accessed 28 Nov. 2019]
O'Brien, Kevin J. and Yanhua Deng. July 2015. “The Reach of the State: Work Units, Family Ties and ‘Harmonious Demolition’.” The China Journal. No. 74. [Accessed 28 Nov. 2019]
Reuters. 12 September 2017. Elias Glenn. “China Extends Rural Land Reform Trial to End-2018.” [Accessed 20 Nov. 2019]
South China Morning Post (SCMP). 6 February 2013. Verna Yu. “Rare Victory for Petitioners as 10 Hired Thugs Are Convicted over 'Black Jail'.” [Accessed 20 Nov. 2019]
United Nations (UN). 19 September 2018. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). Concluding Observations on the Combined Fourteenth to Seventeenth Periodic Reports of China (Including Hong Kong, China and Macao, China). (CERD/C/CHN/CO/14-17) [Accessed 20 Nov. 2019]
United Nations (UN). 28 March 2017. Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights on His Mission to China. (A/HRC/35/26/Add.2) [Accessed 10 Dec. 2019]
United States (US). 11 July 2019a. Department of State. “China.” 2019 Investment Climate Statements. [Accessed 28 Nov. 2019]
United States (US). 11 July 2019b. Department of State. “2019 Investment Climate Statements Released.” 2019 Investment Climate Statements. [Accessed 28 Nov. 2019]
United States (US). 13 March 2019. Department of State. “China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau).” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018. [Accessed 28 Nov. 2019]
United States (US). 31 May 2017. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC). Corruption and Weak Property Protections Fuel Protests in Rural China: The Case of Wukan Village. [Accessed 20 Nov. 2019]
United States (US). 2000. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC). H.R. 4444. [Accessed 9 Dec. 2019]
Additional Sources Consulted
Oral sources: Chinese human rights NGO; human rights lawyer who monitors China; human rights researcher whose interests include Chinese property rights; professor of economics whose research interests include China’s development and urbanization; professor of political science whose research interests include Chinese government practices.
Internet sites, including: Amnesty International; Caixin Global; Chinoiresie; ecoi.net; Elsevier; Factiva; Financial Times; Foreign Affairs; GAN Integrity; The Globe and Mail; Habitat International Coalition; Human Rights Watch; Los Angeles Times; Made in China Journal; The New York Times; Sixth Tone; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy; Xinhua News Agency.