CHAPTER 6 - STATE PROTECTION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

  1. 6.1. INTRODUCTION - GENERAL PRINCIPLES
    1. 6.1.1. Surrogate Protection
    2. 6.1.2. Multiple Nationalities
    3. 6.1.3. Timing of Analysis
    4. 6.1.4. Unable or Unwilling - A Blurred Distinction - No Requirement for State Complicity
    5. 6.1.5. Presumptions
    6. 6.1.6. Nexus
    7. 6.1.7. Burden and Standard of Proof
    8. 6.1.8. Obligation to Approach the State
    9. 6.1.9. Rebutting the Presumption of Protection
    10. 6.1.10. More Than One Authority in the Country
    11. 6.1.11. Adequacy of Protection - Standard
    12. 6.1.12. Source of Protection
  2. 6.2. STATELESS CLAIMANTS
  3. 6.3. APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS
  4. TABLE OF CASES

6. STATE PROTECTION

6.1. INTRODUCTION - GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The issue of state protection was extensively canvassed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ward.Note 1 The context for the discussion of this topic is the requirement in the definition of Convention refugee that the claimant be unable, or by reason of his or her fear of persecution, unwilling to avail him or herself of the protection of the country of nationality (citizenship). As indicated below, the state's ability to protect the claimant is a crucial element in determining whether the fear of persecution is well founded, and as such, is not an independent element of the definition. The issue of state protection goes to the objective portion of the test of fear of persecution and it is not enough to simply assert a subjective belief that protection is not available.Note 2

State protection must be considered in context. The contextual approached was explained by the Court in Gonzalez TorresNote 3 as follows:

[37]…state protection cannot be determined in a vacuum. When undertaking a contextual approach in determining whether the refugee claimant has rebutted the presumption of state protection, many factors ought to be considered, including the following:
  1. The nature of the human rights violation;
  2. The profile of the alleged human rights abuser;
  3. The efforts that the victim took to seek protection from authorities;
  4. The response of the authorities to requests for their assistance, and
  5. The available documentary evidence.

6.1.1. Surrogate Protection

The responsibility to provide international protection only becomes engaged when national or state protection is unavailable to the claimant (international protection as a surrogate).Note 4

6.1.2. Multiple Nationalities

In the case of multiple nationalities (citizenship), the claimant is normally expected to make inquiries or applications to ascertain whether or not he or she might avail him or herself of the protection of all the countries of nationality. The claimant need not literally approach the other states for protection unless there is a reasonable expectation that protection will be forthcoming.Note 5

6.1.3. Timing of Analysis

The state's ability to protect, whether one is speaking of the claimant being "unable" or "unwilling", must be considered at the stage of the analysis when one is examining whether the claimant's fear is well founded.

… The test is in part objective; if a state is able to protect the claimant, then his or her fear is not, objectively speaking, well-founded …

It is clear that the lynch-pin of the analysis is the state's inability to protect: it is a crucial element in determining whether the claimant's fear is well-founded, and thereby the objective reasonableness of his or her unwillingness to seek the protection of his or her state of nationality.Note 6

A claimant who is not at risk does not need state protection and therefore, the issue need not be addressed.Note 7

6.1.4. Unable or Unwilling - A Blurred Distinction - No Requirement for State Complicity

The Convention refugee definition refers to inability or unwillingness to avail of state protection, however, the distinction between "unable" (physically or literally unable) and "unwilling" (not wanting) has become blurred.Note 8

Whether the claimant is "unwilling" or "unable" to avail him- or herself of the protection of a country of nationality, state complicity in the persecution is irrelevant. The distinction between these two branches of the "Convention refugee" definition resides in the party's precluding resort to state protection: in the case of "inability", protection is denied to the claimant, whereas when the claimant is "unwilling", he or she opts not to approach the state by reasons of his or her fear on an enumerated basis. In either case, the state's involvement, in the persecution is not a necessary consideration. This factor is relevant, rather in the determination of whether a fear of persecution exists.Note 9

6.1.5. Presumptions

There are two presumptions at play in refugee determination:

Presumption 1: If the fear of persecution is credible (the Court uses the word "legitimate")Note 10 and there is an absence of state protection, it is not a great leap "… to presume that persecution will be likely, and the fear well-founded."Note 11

Having established the existence of a fear and a state's inability to assuage those fears, it is not assuming too much to say that the fear is well-founded. Of course, the persecution must be real - the presumption cannot be built on fictional events - but the well-foundedness of the fear can be established through the use of such a presumption.Note 12

Presumption 2: Except in situations where the state is in a state of complete breakdown, states must be presumed capable of protecting their citizens. This presumption can be rebutted by "clear and convincing" evidence of the state's inability to protect.Note 13

The danger that [presumption one] will operate too broadly is tempered by a requirement that clear and convincing proof of a state's inability to protect must be advanced.Note 14

In Hinzman,Note 15 the Federal Court of Appeal held that the presumption of state protection described in Ward applies equally to cases where the state is alleged to be the agent of persecution. However, where agents of the state are themselves the source of persecution, the presumption of state protection can be rebutted without exhausting all avenues of recourse in the country.Note 16

6.1.6. Nexus

In Badran,Note 17 the Court indicated that the "law does not require that the inability to protect be connected to a Convention reason." Conversely, one may argue that even though the source of the persecution is not grounded in a Convention reason, a State's failure to act (protect), if motivated by a Convention ground, can establish the nexus to the definition, i.e., the failure to protect for a Convention reason can in itself amount to persecutory treatment.

6.1.7. Burden and Standard of Proof

The claimant's obligation of presenting "clear and convincing" proof of the state's inability to protect should not be an impossible burden.

… it would seem to defeat the purpose of international protection if a claimant would be required to risk his or her life seeking ineffective protection of a state, merely to demonstrate that ineffectiveness.Note 18

The Trial Division in PeraltaNote 19 stated that a claimant is not required to show that he or she has exhausted all avenues of protection. Rather, the claimant has to show that he or she has taken all steps reasonable in the circumstances, taking into account the context of the country of origin in general, the steps taken and the claimant's interactions with the authorities.

The onus of showing the absence of state protection is on the claimant, not the Board.Note 20 This however, does not relieve the RPD of its obligation to provide clear and adequate reasons indicating why the onus was not met.Note 21

In Flores Carrillo,Note 22 the Federal Court of Appeal dealt with the following certified question:

What is meant by the presumption of state protection (as mentioned in [Ward])? Does it impose a particular standard of proof on refugee [claimants] to rebut it, or does it merely impose an obligation to present reliable evidence of a lack of state protection? If it imposes a particular standard of proof, what is it?

The Court answered the question as follows:

A refugee who claims that the state protection is inadequate or non-existent bears the evidentiary burden of adducing evidence to that effect and the legal burden of persuading the trier of fact that his or her claim in this respect is founded. The standard of proof applicable is the balance of probabilities and there is no requirement of a higher degree of probability than what that standard usually requires. As for the quality of the evidence required to rebut the presumption of state protection, the presumption is rebutted by clear and convincing evidenceNote 23 that the state protection is inadequate or non-existent.

The Court has cautioned about faulting a sexually molested child with not approaching the state for protection when the parents themselves do not do so.Note 24

6.1.8. Obligation to Approach the State

A claimant is required to approach his or her state for protection in situations in which protection might reasonably be forthcoming.

… the claimant will not meet the definition of "Convention refugee" where it is objectively unreasonable for the claimant not to have sought the protection of his home authorities: otherwise, the claimant need not literally approach the state.Note 25

In other words, the claimant must show that it was reasonable for him or her not to seek state protection. However, a claimant is not required to risk his or her life seeking ineffective protection of a state, merely to demonstrate that ineffectiveness.Note 26

In D'Mello,Note 27 the Court set aside the decision of the CRDD because the panel's analysis was inadequate with respect to the principle in Ward that a claimant should not be required to risk her life seeking ineffective state protection merely to prove the ineffectiveness. In this case,

the [claimant's] fear did not rest on the lack of legislative and procedural framework in India to protect women abused by their husbands or agents of their husbands, but rather on the lack of police support to such women and the difficulty, given the lack of such support, in effectively taking advantage and having recourse to the existing legislative and procedural framework of state protection in India. (At paragraph 13).Note 28

Where agents of the state are themselves the source of persecution, and where the claimant's credibility is not undermined, the presumption of state protection can be rebutted without exhausting every conceivable recourse in the country.Note 29 Also, the Court has noted that it is unreasonable for the RPD to not take into account the fact that a claimant's situation became more serious after a complaint was made.Note 30

6.1.9. Rebutting the Presumption of Protection

Absent an admission by the state that it is unable to protect (as was the case in Ward), a claimant can establish, with "clear and convincing evidence",Note 31 that state protection would not be reasonably forthcoming (thus rebutting the presumption) where:

  1. there is a complete breakdown of state apparatus, such as that recognized in Lebanon in Zalzali;Note 32
  2. there is evidence "…similarly situated individuals [were] let down by the state protection arrangements…;"Note 33
  3. there is evidence "…of past personal incidents in which state protection did not materialize."Note 34

The Court refers to the Federal Court of Appeal decision in SatiacumNote 35and quotes with approval the following statement:

In the absence of exceptional circumstances established by the claimant, it seems to me that in a Convention refugee hearing, as in an extradition hearing, Canadian tribunals have to assume a fair and independent judicial process in the foreign country. In the case of a non-democratic State, contrary evidence might be readily forthcoming, but in relation to a democracy like the United States contrary evidence might have to go to the extent of substantially impeaching, for example, the jury selection process in the relevant part of the country, or the independence or fair-mindedness of the judiciary itself.Note 36

In Kadenko,Note 37 which is discussed later in section 6.1.12, the Court of Appeal noted that the burden of proof to establish absence of state protection is "directly proportional to the level of democracy in the state in question …"

In Hinzman,Note 38 the Federal Court of Appeal noted that a claimant coming from a democratic country (like the US) will have a heavy burden when attempting to show that he or she should not have been required to exhaust all of the recourses available domestically before claiming protection elsewhere. However, as noted in Katwaru,Note 39 democracy alone does not guarantee effective state protection. The Board is required to do more than determine whether a country has a democratic political system and must assess the quality of the institutions that provide state protection. Another case that refers to the need for a contextual analysis is Loaiza,Note 40 where the Court noted that the analysis must begin with an assessment of the personal circumstances of the claimant and the degree of the individual risk faced. The Court noted that in some countries there may be only a weak correlation between the existence of a constitutional democracy and a willingness of the state to take effective measures against spousal abuse. See also Leon Davila,Note 41 where the Court noted that the Board must proceed with a fulsome and contextualized analysis of each claimant's particular situation and that it is not enough to state broadly that there are free and general elections, and that legislation has been enacted to ensure basic standards of human rights.

It is incorrect to use the criterion of "basis for protection" based on some comparative analysis with other countries as the legal test for state protection. The Board must address the issues of adequate and effective state protection.Note 42

6.1.10. More Than One Authority in the Country

The Court of Appeal in ZalzaliNote 43 recognized that there may be several established authorities in a country which are each able to provide protection in the part of the country controlled by them.

The "country", the "national government", the "legitimate government", the "nominal government" will probably vary depending on the circumstances and the evidence and it would be presumptuous to attempt to give a general definition. I will simply note here that I do not rule out the possibility that there may be several established authorities in the same country which are each able to provide protection in the part of the territory controlled by them, protection which may be adequate though not necessarily perfect.Note 44

In Chebli-Haj-Hassam,Note 45 the Court of Appeal answered a certified question on this matter as follows:

In the circumstances where there is a legitimate government supported by the forces of another government and there is no difference in interest between the two governments in relation to a refugee claimant, the protection given to the claimant is adequate to establish an internal refuge.

In Choker,Note 46 the Court appears to question the reasonableness of the CRDD conclusion that a Lebanese claimant could and should seek the protection of an invading army (the Court was considering whether the tribunal had applied the law on IFA correctly.)

6.1.11. Adequacy of Protection - Standard

One aspect of protection which was not discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ward is the standard of protection that a country needs to offer its citizens. One standard suggested by the Federal Court of Appeal is "…adequate though not necessarily perfect".Note 47 This standard has been followed and applied in a large number of cases.

In Villafranca,Note 48 the Court of Appeal, considering the claim of a Philippine policeman who feared a terrorist guerrilla group, again suggested that protection need not be perfect:

No government that makes any claim to democratic values or protection of human rights can guarantee the protection of all of its citizens at all times. Thus it is not enough for a claimant merely to show that his government has not always been effective at protecting persons in his particular situation. Terrorism in the name of one warped ideology or another is a scourge afflicting many societies today; its victims, however much they may merit our sympathy, do not become Convention refugees simply because their governments have been unable to suppress the evil. … where a state is in effective control of its territory, has military, police and civil authority in place, and makes serious efforts to protect its citizens from terrorist activities, the mere fact that it is not always successful at doing so will not be enough to justify a claim that the victims of terrorism are unable to avail themselves of such protection.Note 49

The "serious efforts" standard alluded to in Villafranca has been followed in a number of cases, see for example Kashif,Note 50 where the Court noted that state protection need not be perfect so long as the state is in effective control and makes serious efforts to protect its citizens.

There are a few cases which take a broad view of protection. For example, in Bobrik,Note 51 Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer, in considering the claims of a Jewish couple from Russia stated that:

… even when the state is willing to protect its citizens, a claimant will meet the criteria for refugee status if the protection being offered is ineffective. A state must actually provide protection, and not merely indicate a willingness to help. Where the evidence reveals that a claimant has experienced many incidents of harassment and/or discrimination without being effectively defended by the state, the presumption operates and it can be concluded that the state may be willing but unable to protect the claimant.

Mr. Justice Gibson, in Smirnov,Note 52 stated that in his view, "… [Bobrik] sets too high a standard for state protection…". He further indicated that:

Random assaults such as those suffered by the [claimants], where the assailants are unknown to the victim and there are no independent witnesses are also difficult to effectively investigate and protect against. In all such circumstances, even the most effective, well-resourced and highly motivated police forces will have difficulty providing effective protection. This Court should not impose on other states a standard of "effective" protection that police forces in our own country, regrettably, sometimes only aspire to.

The issue of whether the standard of protection is effectiveness, rather than adequacy, continues to be raised in judicial reviews. While some cases suggest effectiveness is the correct standard, the preponderance of cases follow Villafranca and adopt the adequacy standard.

In James,Note 53 the Court noted that "a finding of adequate protection cannot flow from police assistance to leave the country that is unable to provide adequate protection." Likewise, it is manifestly wrong for the Board to consider police criminality (i.e., the use of unofficial and illegal means to achieve results against criminal elements) as evidence of the effectiveness of state protection. Police corruption is the antithesis of state protection and is only properly considered as evidence of the breakdown of the protective apparatus of state protection.Note 54

In Zhuravlvev,Note 55 Mr. Justice Pelletier reviewed the authorities and drew the following conclusions:

[31] … when the agent of persecution is not the state, the lack of state protection has to be assessed as a matter of state capacity to provide protection rather than from the perspective of whether the local apparatus provided protection in a given circumstance. Local failures to provide effective policing do not amount to lack of state protection. However, where the evidence, including the documentary evidence situates the individual claimant's experience as part of a broader pattern of state inability or refusal to extend protection, then the absence of state protection is made out. The question of refusal to provide protection should be addressed on the same basis as the inability to provide protection. A local refusal to provide protection is not a state refusal in the absence of evidence of a broader state policy to not extend state protection to the target group … [the] refusal may not be overt; the state organs may justify their failure to act by reference to various factors which, in their view, would make any state action ineffective. It is for the CRDD to assess the bona fides of these assertions in the light of all the evidence.

[32] …[As regards] the issue of internal flight alternative in relation to state inability or refusal to provide protection, … if state policy restricts a claimant's access to the whole of the state's territory, then the failure to provide local protection can be seen to be as state failure to provide protection and not mere local failure

6.1.12. Source of Protection

Where the state is not the agent of persecution, the availability of state run or funded agencies capable of providing assistance is relevant for determining the existence of state protection.Note 56

The case law has been inconsistent on the question of whether the claimant needs to seek protection from sources other than the state. In Thakur, the Trial Division seems to say that the fact that civil rights groups are able to conduct investigations of alleged abuses is irrelevant to the question of protection.Note 57

A similar point was made in Risak,Note 58 where the Court also considered the claimant's obligation to pursue further legal remedies after initial complaints to the state's authorities fail:

… the question is whether or not it was objectively reasonable to expect the [claimant] to have further sought the protection from the army and the police in Israel after having been so brutally rebuffed by the very authorities from whom citizens expect protection. There is nothing in our jurisprudence to the effect that in such situations the [claimant] has the further burden to seek assistance from human rights organizations or, ultimately, to launch an action in court against the government.

A related question is whether one can say that the state has failed to provide protection where the protection is denied by certain elements of the state, for example, individual police officers.Note 59 In Kadenko,Note 60 the Court of Appeal dealt with the following certified question:

Where there has not been a complete breakdown of the government apparatus and where a State has political and judicial institutions capable of protecting its citizens, does the refusal by certain police officers to take action suffice to establish that that State in question is unable or unwilling to protect its nationals?

The Court answered the question in the negative:

Once it is assumed that the state (Israel in this case) has political and judicial institutions capable of protecting its citizens, it is clear that the refusal of certain police officers to take action cannot in itself make the state incapable of doing so. …

When the state in question is a democratic state … the claimant must do more than simply show that he or she went to see some members of the police force and that his or her efforts were unsuccessful. The burden of proof that rests on the claimant is, in a way, directly proportional to the level of democracy in the state in question: the more democratic the state's institutions, the more the claimant must have done to exhaust all the courses of action open to him or her. (at 2-3)

The Trial Division held in a number of decisions that the availability of protection from non-state sources may, nevertheless, be relevant to establishing an objective basis for the claim.Note 61 Other more recent case law on the subject of claimants' obligation to approach state-funded non-governmental agencies for assistance seems to suggest that these agencies are part and parcel of the protection network and that at the very least, their existence and the claimant's willingness to approach them for assistance in obtaining protection is a relevant consideration in the assessment of the claim.Note 62

In Szucs,Note 63 the Court dismissed the judicial review application of the decision of the CRDD with respect to the claim of a Romani claimant from Hungary, and noted that:

[27] … In determining the availability of state protection, the Board was also entitled to examine all reasonable steps the Applicant had taken in the circumstances to seek protection of his state of origin.

[28] … The Board found that for more serious and persistent forms of discrimination like eviction from housing, persistent unemployment due to discrimination or other serious harm, there was a network of government and government sponsored organizations throughout Hungary which assist without charge those so threatened.

[29] The evidence established that the applicant had never tried to seek help from either the Ombudsman, NGO's or through minority self-government. I find that the Board, in requiring the Applicant to exhaust these avenues of protection in addition to police protection, was asking the Applicant to take reasonable steps to ensure his protection.

The adequacy of state protection cannot rest on the subjective fear of the claimant.

[7] What is crucial to this case is that the Applicant made only two attempts to seek assistance, one of which was to police who had no local jurisdiction to deal with her complaint. She then formed the opinion that no other assistance would be forthcoming. This purely subjective view of the adequacy of Costa Rica state protection is not "direct, relevant and compelling" evidence of the inadequacy of state protection.Note 64

6.2. STATELESS CLAIMANTS

As to whether stateless claimants need to avail themselves of state protection, the UNHCR Handbook, in paragraph 101 states that "…[i]n the case of a stateless refugee, the question of 'availment of protection' of the country of his former habitual residence does not, of course, arise…"

In El Khatib,Note 65 Mr. Justice McKeown agreed with this approach and stated:

… the discussion and conclusions reached in Ward apply only to citizens of a state, and not to stateless people. In my view the distinction between paragraphs 2(1)(a)(i) and 2(1)(a)(ii) of the Act is that the stateless person is not expected to avail himself of state protection when there is no duty on the state to provide such protection.Note 66

However, other Trial Division decisions have taken into account state protection that might be available to the claimant in his country of former habitual residence.Note 67 For example, in NizarNote 68 the Court was of the view that, even though states owe no duty of protection to non-nationals, "it is relevant for a stateless person, who has a country of former habitual residence, to demonstrate that defacto [sic] protection within that state, as a result of being resident there is not likely to exist." The Court reasoned that this was relevant to the well-foundedness of the claimant's fear.

The Federal Court of Appeal in Thabet,Note 69 in the context of discussing whether a stateless claimant who has more than one country of former habitual residence must establish the claim with respect to one, some or all of the countriesNote 70, had this to say about the issue of state protection:

… The definition takes into account the inherent difference between those persons who are nationals of a state, and therefore are owed protection, and those persons who are stateless and without recourse to state protection. Because of this distinction one cannot treat the two groups identically, even though one should seek to be as consistent as possible. (At 33).

… If it is likely that a person would be able to return to a country of former habitual residence where he or she would be safe from persecution, that person is not a refugee. This means that the claimant would bear the burden … of showing on the balance of probabilities that he or she is unable or unwilling to return to any country of former habitual residence. (At 39).

6.3. APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONSNote 71

In analyzing the situation in Peru (on the basis of the evidence filed in the particular case), the Court of Appeal stated:

Isolated cases of persons having been victimized may not reverse the presumption. A state of profound unrest with ineffective protection for the claimant may, however, have reversed it.Note 72

The protection which is given to ordinary citizens may not be adequate for persons specifically targeted. Although the state is capable of protecting ordinary citizens, it may be incapable of protecting persons specifically targeted, and the latter may therefore have good grounds for fearing persecution.Note 73

The claimant may show that he or she is physically prevented from seeking state protection or that the state is prevented from giving the protection, where, for example, the state refuses to give protection,Note 74 there is no government to turn to,Note 75 or there is ineffective state protection.Note 76

Where the agent of persecution acts on behalf of the state, the appropriate inquiry is under the "unwilling" branch of the definition.

While it may not be necessary to prove state complicity in certain situations, in this instance, the tribunal admitted that the persecuting agents were thugs of the ruling UNP. As such, the determination to be made is squarely within the "unwilling" branch of … the definition. Since the persecuting agent is the state or its actors, the appropriate inquiry is whether the [claimants'] unwillingness to seek the protection of Sri Lanka is based on a well-founded fear of persecution. The Board made a fundamental error when it stated that "it is also not satisfied that the state is either unable or unwilling to offer protection should the female claimant decide to seek such protection." The question is not whether the state would be willing to protect, but whether the applicant is willing to seek the protection of the state. It is the well-foundedness of the [claimant's] perspective regarding the state's actions which is determinative."Note 77

Where the claimant fears the army and the evidence establishes that the army is in control of the entire territory, particularly if the country is small, the claimant may be unable to seek the protection of the state.Note 78

Where there is widespread violence and the state fails to take effective steps to curb it despite repeated promises to do so, it is unreasonable to conclude that a claimant could rely on that state for protection.Note 79

In cases of domestic or sexual violence, where there is evidence that the government is taking steps to protect women, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be presumed that these steps will be effective.Note 80 Whether a request for protection is useless after a rape has occurred is not the issue, but rather whether the state is willing, able and disposed to protect a claimant in the face of such acts if she were to return.Note 81 What is important is to analyze, not merely whether a legislative and procedural framework exists, but also whether the state, through the police and otherwise, was willing to effectively implement any such framework.Note 82

In deciding whether a claimant can count on the protection of the state, one must consider not only the state's ability to protect, but also its willingness. While the Ghanian government had sometimes shown an intention to make female circumcision illegal, it was still tolerating the practice.Note 83 On the other hand, in a case where the claimant feared ritual murder in Ghana, the Court noted that that practice was officially condemned by the government and that the claimant never sought the protection of the authorities nor showed that they had failed or refused to protect him.Note 84

In situations involving sectarian violence, the police may sometimes choose to offer only a passive response i.e., advise a claimant to refrain from lodging a complaint as that could ignite the situation even further. In Hussain,Note 85 in considering a claim from Pakistan, the Court noted that "…police intervention, in certain circumstances, can be counterproductive. Police authorities have to make choices, taking account of priorities, tactics and community relations. They may sometimes reasonably conclude that the better course is for them to stay out of certain events."

TABLE OF CASES

  1. Aguilar Soto, Rafael Alberto v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1883-10), Shore, November 25, 2010; 2010 FC 1183
  2. Ahmed, Ali v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2868-99), Pinard, May 17, 2000
  3. Ajieh, John Kenneth Andzayie v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4985-01), MacKay, March 3, 2003; 2003 FCT 266
  4. Alfaro, Oscar Luis Alfaro v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6905-03), O'Keefe, January 20, 2005; 2005 FC 92
  5. Alli, Lukman v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1984-01), O'Keefe, April 26, 2002; 2002 FCT 479
  6. Almendarez Matute, Reina Isabel v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4698-06), Barnes, June 8, 2007; 2007 FC 616
  7. Annan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] 3 F.C. 25 (T.D.)
  8. Antypov, Roksana v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4251-04), Kelen, November 15, 2004; 2004 FC 1589
  9. Aramburo, Juan Carlos v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6782-93), Cullen, December 7, 1994
  10. Arguedas, Maricela Los Angeles Alfaro v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5766-02), Lemieux, January 23, 2004; 2004 FC 112
  11. Arias Aguilar, Jennifer v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1000-05), Rouleau, November 9, 2005; 2005 FC 1519
  12. Ayisi-Nyarko, Isaac v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3671-03), O'Reilly, December 10, 2003; 2003 FC 1425
  13. Badilla, Olman Gamboa v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2738-04), Layden-Stevenson, April 20, 2005; 2005 FC 535
  14. Badoeva, Manana v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4925-99), Rouleau, November 29, 2000
  15. Badran, Housam v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2472-95), McKeown, March 29, 1996
  16. Bae, Ki Hwa v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2275-06), Hughes, April 19, 2007; 2007 FC 414
  17. Baku, Ervin v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1090-10), Pinard, November 25, 2010; 2010 FC 1163
  18. Baldizon-Ortegaray, German Jose v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. 92-T-1933), May 7, 1993. Reported: Baldizon-Ortegaray v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 20 Imm. L.R. (2d) 307 (F.C.T.D.)
  19. Balogh, Rudolf v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6193-00), Lemieux, July 22, 2002; 2002 FCT 809
  20. Balogh: M.C.I. v. Balogh, Jozsef (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-982-01), Heneghan, November 6, 2001
  21. Banya, Tamas Aron v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4630-10), Harrington, March 15, 2011; 2011 FC 313
  22. Barabhuiyan, Abdullah Al Mamun v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-998-92), Tremblay-Lamer, November 30, 1993
  23. Bobrik, Iouri v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5519-93), Tremblay-Lamer, September 16, 1994
  24. Bohorquez, Gabriel Enriquez v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-7078-93), McGillis, October 6, 1994
  25. Bors, Karolyne v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1899-10), Shore, October 12, 2010; 2010 FC 1004
  26. Boston, Edwin v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6554-06), Snider, December 4, 2007; 2007 FC 1271
  27. Bukhari, Zubair Hayder v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6344-93), Richard, November 18, 1994
  28. Callejas, Ana Lucretia v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-48-93), Gibson, February 1, 1994. Reported: Callejas v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 23 Imm. L.R. (2d) 253 (F.C.T.D.)
  29. Camacho, Jane Egre Sonia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4300-06), Barnes, August 10, 2007; 2007 FC 830
  30. Carrillo, Marlene Sirias v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4908-03), Snider, June 30, 2004; 2004 FC 944
  31. Cascante, Maria Leila Bermudez v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4343-03), Kelen, April 26, 2004; 2004 FC 603
  32. Chaves, Alejandro Jose Martinez v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-603-04), Tremblay-Lamer, February 8, 2005; 2005 FC 193
  33. Chebli-Haj-Hassam, Atef v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-191-95), Marceau, MacGuigan, Décary, May 28, 1996. Reported: Chebli-Haj-Hassam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 36 Imm. L.R. (2d) 112 (F.C.A.)
  34. Cho, Soon Ja v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4029-99), Gibson, August 9, 2000
  35. Choker, Ali v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1345-92), Dubé, July 30, 1993
  36. Clyne, Timeka Marsha v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7653-03), O'Reilly, November 29, 2004; 2004 FC 1670
  37. Contreras, Carlos Fabian Vassallo v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2555-94), MacKay, May 19, 1995. Reported: Contreras v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 36 Imm. L.R. (2d) 75 (F.C.T.D.)
  38. Cuffy, Loferne Pauline v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3135-95), McKeown, October 16, 1996
  39. D.C.L. v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3542-05), von Finckenstein, March 27, 2006; 2006 FC 384
  40. D'Mello, Carol Shalini v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1236-97), Gibson, January 22, 1998
  41. Dannett, Avril v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6815-05), Russell, November 10, 2006; 2006 FC 1363
  42. De Araujo Garcia, Debora v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5987-05), Campbell, January 24, 2007; 2007 FC 79
  43. De Baez, Maria Beatriz Arguello v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3208-02), Dawson, June 26, 2003; 2003 FCT 785
  44. Diaz De Leon, Andromeda v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6429-06), Frenette, December 12, 2007; 2007 FC 1307
  45. Duceac, Maria v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-899-06), O'Reilly, November 23, 2006; 2006 FC 1400
  46. El Khatib, Naif v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5182-93), McKeown, September 27, 1994
  47. El Khatib: M.C.I. v. El Khatib, Naif (F.C.A., no. A-592-94), Strayer, Robertson, McDonald, June 20, 1996
  48. Elastal, Mousa Hamed v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3425-97), Muldoon, March 10, 1999
  49. Falberg, Victor v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-328-94), Richard, April 19, 1995
  50. Farias, Carlos Humbero Gonzales v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3305-96), Lutfy, October 3, 1997
  51. Ferguson, Gloria v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5927-01), Noël, November 22, 2002: 2002 FCT 1212
  52. Fernandez, Laura v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4591-93), Wetston, July 19, 1994
  53. Flores Carrillo: M.C.I. v. Flores Carrillo, Maria del Rosario (F.C.A., no. A-225-07), Létourneau, Nadon, Sharlow, March 12, 2008; 2008 FCA 94
  54. Freiberg, Valentina v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3419-93), Tremblay-Lamer, May 27, 1994
  55. G.F. v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1012-95), Muldoon, June 17, 1996
  56. Garcia Aldana, Paco Jesus v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2113-06), Hughes, April 19, 2007; 2007 FC 423
  57. Giatch, Stanislav v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3438-93), Gibson, March 22, 1994
  58. Gonzales, Abel Guillermo Mayorga v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-117-93), Noël, February 25, 1994
  59. Gonzalez Torres, Luis Felipe v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1351-09), Zinn, March 1, 2010; 2010 FC 234
  60. Guirgas, Nabil v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2131-96), Jerome, August 20, 1997
  61. Hernandez-Ruiz: M.E.I. v. Hernandez-Ruiz, Maria (F.C.A., no. A-20-92), Marceau, Létourneau, Robertson, February 8, 1993
  62. Hinzman, Jeremy v. M.C.I. and Hughey, Brandon David v. M.C.I. (F.C.A, nos. A-182-06; A-185-06). Décary, Sexton, Evans, April 30, 2007; 2007 FCA 171
  63. Horvath, Szuzsanna v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4001-01), Blanchard, November 22, 2002; 2002 FCT 1206
  64. Howard-Dejo, Luis Fern v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1179-92), Noël, February 2, 1995
  65. Hussain, Majeed v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2345-02), O'Reilly, April 8, 2003; 2003 FCT 406
  66. Inigo Contreras, Victor v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3954-05), von Finckenstein, May 16, 2006; 2006 FC 603
  67. Isufi, Arlind v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5631-02), Tremblay-Lamer, July 15, 2003; 2003 FC 880
  68. Ivachtchenko, Artem v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4964-01), Lemieux, December 12, 2001; 2002 FCT 1291
  69. James, Cherrie Ann Louanne v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3352-97), Wetston, June 1, 1998. Reported: James v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), 44 Imm. L.R. (2d) 16 (F.C.T.D)
  70. James, Sherica Sherilon v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5039-09), Mainville, May 18, 2010; 2010 FC 546
  71. Johan: M.E.I. v. Johan, Stephen (F.C.T.D., no. T-1389-92), Denault, February 9, 1993
  72. Jonas, Laszlo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2726-03), Mosley, August 4, 2004; 2004 FC 1066
  73. Judge, Gurwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5897-03), Snider, August 9, 2004; 2004 FC 1089
  74. Kadenko: M.C.I. v. Kadenko, Ninal (F.C.A., no. A-388-95), Hugessen, Décary, Chevalier, October 15, 1996. Reported: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Kadenko (1996), 143 D.L.R. (4th) 532 (F.C.A.)
  75. Karaseva, Tatiana v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4683-96), Teitelbaum, November 26, 1997
  76. Karoly, Szalo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1566-04), Blais, March 24, 2005; 2005 FC 412
  77. Kashif, Muhammad v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3872-06), Mosley, June 4, 2007; 2007 FC 586
  78. Katwaru, Shivanand Kumar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3368-06), Teitelbaum, June 8, 2007; 2007 FC 612
  79. Kogan, Meri v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-7282-93), Noël, June 5, 1995
  80. Kraitman, Vadim v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-88-94), Teitelbaum, July 5, 1994. Reported: Kraitman v. Canada (Secretary of State) (1994), 27 Imm. L.R. (2d) 283 (F.C.T.D.)
  81. Kwayisi, Vida v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3756-04), Layden-Stevenson, April 20, 2005; 2005 FC 533
  82. Leon Davila, Marco Antonio v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7645-05), de Montigny, December 11, 2006; 2006 FC 1475
  83. Lerer, Iakov v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-7438-93), Cullen, January 5, 1995
  84. Levitina (Chikhovtseva), Tatiana v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6591-93), Noël, January 27, 1995
  85. Levkovicz, Ilia v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-599-94), Nadon, March 13, 1995
  86. Loaiza Brenes, Heyleen v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2445-06), Barnes, April 2, 2007; 2007 FC 351
  87. Machado, Hugo Ricardo Gonzalez v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-7155-93), Rothstein, October 27, 1994
  88. Madoui, Nidhal Abderrah v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-660-96), Denault, October 25, 1996
  89. Malik, Gurjit Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1918-02), Tremblay-Lamer, April 17, 2003; 2003 FCT 453
  90. Mallam, Sanni Mohammad v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2780-96), Pinard, June 30, 1997
  91. Malveda, Dennis v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6519-06), Russell, April 4, 2008; 2008 FC 447
  92. Mann, Satinder Pal Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6554-00), Tremblay-Lamer, September 6, 2001
  93. Manorath, Rahonie v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2369-94), Cullen, January 26, 1995
  94. Martinez, Dunnia Patricia Suarez v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7329-04), Phelan, July 29, 2005; 2005 FC 1050
  95. Medina, Blanca Patricia v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2322-94), Simpson, October 30, 1995
  96. Mejia, Alberto v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2757-03), Pinard, June 30, 2004; 2004 FC 925
  97. Mejia, Juana Ubaldina Garcia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. 4645-02), Tremblay-Lamer, October 10, 2003; 2003 FC 1180
  98. Mendivil, Luis Altamirano v. S.S.C. (F.C.A., no. A-132-93), Marceau, Stone, Desjardins, February 7, 1994. Reported: Mendivil v. Canada (Secretary of State) (1994), 23 Imm. L.R. (2d) 225 (F.C.A.)
  99. Mendoza, Elizabeth Aurora Hauayek v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2997-94), Muldoon, January 24, 1996
  100. Milev, Dane v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1125-95), MacKay, June 28, 1996
  101. Miranda, Elmer Edgar Valencia v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5882-93), Muldoon, March 31, 1995
  102. Mohacsi, Janos v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1298-02), Martineau, April 11, 2003; 2003 FCT 429
  103. Molnar, Elek v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-285-02), Tremblay-Lamer, October 16, 2002; 2002 FCT 1081
  104. Morales Filigrana, Felipe v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2440-05), Harrington, October 25, 2005; 2005 FC 1447
  105. Moreno, Sebastian Velasco v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-454-10), Lutfy, October 5, 2010; 2010 FC 993
  106. Muotoh, Ndukwe Christopher v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3330-05), Blais, November 25, 2005; 2005 FC 1599
  107. Musorin, (Rodshtein), Valei v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2218-04), Snider, March 24, 2005; 2005 FC 408
  108. Nadeem, Choudhry Muhammad v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6320-00), McKeown, November 15, 2001
  109. Nagy, Laszlo v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1467-01), Simpson, March 14, 2002; 2002 FCT 281
  110. Nduwimana, Thierive v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1077-01), Lutfy, July 23, 2002; 2002 FCT 812
  111. Neto, Joao Reis v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4061-06), Mactavish, June 21, 2007; 2007 FC 664
  112. Nizar v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1-92), Reed, January 10, 1996
  113. Nunez, Anibal Christyan Monte Rey v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-925-05), Mosley, December 6, 2005; 2005 FC 1661
  114. Oblitas, Jorge v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2489-94), Muldoon, February 2, 1995
  115. Olah: M.C.I. v. Olah, Bernadett (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2763-01), McKeown, May 24, 2002; 2002 FCT 595
  116. Ortega: M.C.I. v. Ortega, Alberto Sandova (F.C., no. IMM-2910-03), O'Keefe, October 20, 2004; 2004 FC 1463
  117. Ozvald, Zoltan v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6402-03), Lemieux, September 15, 2004; 2004 FC 1250
  118. Pachkov, Stanislav v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2340-98), Teitelbaum, January 8, 1999. Reported: Pachkov v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999), 49 Imm. L.R. (2d) 55 (F.C.T.D.)
  119. Paul, Doris v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1470-07), Shore, April 17, 2007; 2007 FC 398
  120. Peralta Razo, Juan Carlos v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-209-06), Dawson, November 30, 2007; 2007 FC 1265
  121. Peralta, Gloria Del Carmen v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5451-01), Heneghan, September 20, 2002; 2002 FCT 989
  122. Persue, Yolande v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5827-03), Snider, July 29, 2004; 2004 FC 1042
  123. Petit, Juan Daniel Ayllon v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1197-92), Rouleau, January 12, 1996
  124. Pikulin, Alexandr v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5787-09), Martineau, October 1, 2010; 2010 FC 979
  125. Pilliyan, Ponni v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5320-03), Phelan, May 28, 2004; 2004 FC 784
  126. Prieto Velasco, Augosto Pedro v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3900-06), Shore, February 8, 2007; 2007 FC 133
  127. Quintero, Wilfredo Cruz v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3447-96), Campbell, June 6, 1997
  128. Rajudeen, Zahirdeen v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-1779-83), Heald, Hugessen, Stone (concurring), July 4, 1984. Reported: Rajudeen v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1984), 55 N.R. 129 (F.C.A.)
  129. Resulaj, Blerina v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9548-04), Layden-Stevenson, February 28, 2006; 2006 FC 269
  130. Risak, Boris v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6087-93), Dubé, October 24, 1994. Reported: Risak v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 25 Imm. L.R. (2d) 267 (F.C.T.D.)
  131. Rivera, Jesus Vargas v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5824-02), Beaudry, November 5, 2003: 2003 FC 1292
  132. Roble, Abdi Burale v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-1101-91), Heald, Stone, McDonald, April 25, 1994. Reported: Roble v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 169 N.R. 125 (F.C.A.)
  133. Rodriguez Capitaine, Rogelio v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3449-07), Gauthier, January 24, 2008; 2008 FC 98
  134. Saavedra Sanchez, Perla v. M.C.I. (F.C., IMM-1604-07), Barnes, February 5, 2008; 2008 FC 134
  135. Saidi, Ahmed Abrar v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-749-92), Wetston, September 14, 1993
  136. Salazar Santos, Marco Antonio v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4602-06), Barnes, July 30, 2007; 2007 FC 793
  137. Sami, Sami Qowdon v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-629-92), Simpson, June 1, 1994
  138. Sanchez, Leonardo Gonzalez v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3154-03), Mactavish, May 18, 2004; 2004 FC 731
  139. Sandy, Theresa Charmaine v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-22-95), Reed, June 30, 1995
  140. Sanxhaku, Rexhep v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3086-99), Dawson, June 9, 2000
  141. Satiacum: M.E.I. v. Satiacum, Robert (F.C.A., no. A-554-87), Urie, Mahoney, MacGuigan, June 16, 1989. Reported: Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Satiacum (1989), 99 N.R. 171 (F.C.A.)
  142. Segura Cortes, Tania Elisa v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-951-06), von Finckenstein, December 12, 2006; 2006 FC 1487
  143. Silva, Donakanthi Sujatha v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4584-93), Denault, August 3, 1994
  144. Smirnov v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1995] 1 F.C. 780 (T.D.)
  145. Smith: M.C.I. v. Smith, Bob (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3068-97), Lutfy, December 7, 1998
  146. Soopramanien, Dorothy Anette v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1572-92), Pinard, October 5, 1993
  147. Starikov, Nicolai v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1200-95), Pinard, 10 April 1996
  148. Surujpal, Khemraj v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-515-84), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan, April 25, 1985. Reported: Surujpal v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1985), 60 N.R. 73 (F.C.A.)
  149. Szorenyi, Gabor v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2817-02), O'Keefe, November 25, 2003; 2003 FC 1382
  150. Szucs, Sandor v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6248-99), Blais, October 3, 2000
  151. Tarakhan, Ali v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1506-95), Denault, November 10, 1995. Reported: Tarakhan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 32 Imm. L.R. (2d) 83 (F.C.T.D.)
  152. Tatarski, Aleksandar Zhivkov v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5590-09), Beaudry, June 17, 2010; 2010 FC 660
  153. Thabet, Marwan Youssef v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-20-96), Linden, McDonald, Henry, May 11, 1998. Reported: Thabet v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 4 F.C. 21 (C.A.)
  154. Thakur, Ramesh Chander v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. 92-T-1665), Dubé, June 18, 1993
  155. Torres, Betsabe Del Carmen Balmaceda v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2009-04), Pinard, May 10, 2005; 2005 FC 660
  156. Troya Jimenez, Jose Walter v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-128-10), Mainville, July 7, 2010; 2010 FC 727
  157. Ullah, Safi v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7814-04), Phelan, July 22,2005; 2005 FC 1018
  158. Varga, Attila Csaba v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3363-00), McKeown, May 18, 2001
  159. Velarde-Alvarez, Jorge Luis v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-194-94), McKeown, February 9, 1995. Reported: Velarde-Alvarez, Jorge Luis v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-194-94), McKeown, February 9, 1995. Reported as Velarde-Alvarez v. Canada (Secretary of State) (1995), 27 Imm. L.R. (2d) 88 (F.C.T.D.)
  160. Vickneswaramoorthy: M.C.I. v. Vickneswaramoorthy, Poologam (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2634-96), Jerome, October 2, 1997
  161. Vielma, Eduardo Enrique Pena v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-786-94), Rothstein, November 10, 1994
  162. Villafranca: M.E.I. v. Villafranca, Ignacio (F.C.A., no. A-69-90), Hugessen, Marceau, Décary, December 18, 1992. Reported: Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Villafranca (1992), 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 130 (F.C.A.)
  163. Villanueva, Carlos Wilfredo Flores v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6897-03), Pinard, October 1, 2004; 2004 FC 1320
  164. Virag, Istvan Pal v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2761-02), Simpson, June 2, 2003; 2003 FCT 698
  165. Ward: Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 103 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 20 Imm. L.R. (2d) 85
  166. Williams, Debby v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4244-94), Reed, June 30, 1995
  167. Yaguna, Jose Stalin Rojas v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2468-94), Simpson, May 25, 1995
  168. Yanahida, Gustavo Angel Castro v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6019-93), Richard, October 13, 1994
  169. Ye, Xin Hao v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-276-01), O'Keefe, February 25, 2002; 2002 FCT 201
  170. Yokota, Aldo Renato Rossi v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8386-03), Lutfy, September 8, 2004; 2004 FC 1226
  171. Zaidan, Bilal v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1147-92), Noël, June 16, 1994
  172. Zalzali v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] 3 F.C. 605 (C.A.)
  173. Zhuravlvev v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] 4 F.C. 3 (T.D.)
  174. Zvonov, Sergei v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3030-93), Rouleau, July 18, 1994. Reported: Zvonov v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 28 Imm. L.R. (2d) 23 (F.C.T.D.)

Notes

Note 1

Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 103 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 20 Imm. L.R. (2d) 85.

Return to note 1 referrer

Note 2

M.C.I. v. Olah, Bernadett (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2763-01), McKeown, May 24, 2002; 2002 FCT 595. The Court noted that the relevant evidence to determine the issue of state protection would include the documentary evidence and the personal circumstances of the claimant. However, the claimant's own subjective feelings on state protection would not be a relevant factor. See also Judge, Gurwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5897-03), Snider, August 9, 2004; 2004 FC 1089, where the Court confirmed that the test for determining whether state protection might reasonably be forthcoming is an objective one. In Camacho, Jane Egre Sonia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4300-06), Barnes, August 10, 2007; 2007 FC 830, the Court noted that a refugee claimant does not rebut the presumption of state protection in a functioning democracy by asserting only a "subjective" reluctance to engage the state. On the same point, see Baku, Ervin v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1090-10), Pinard, November 25, 2010; 2010 FC 1163

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Note 3

Gonzalez Torres, Luis Felipe v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1351-09), Zinn, March 1, 2010; 2010 FC 234. The Court elaborates further at paragraphs 37-42.

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Note 4

Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 709. In Madoui, Nidhal Abderrah v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-660-96), Denault, October 25, 1996, the claimant, who was from Algeria, had spent some time in Italy before coming to Canada. The CRDD held that the failure to claim refugee status in Italy showed a lack of subjective fear. Before the Court, the claimant relied on statistics showing that Italy rarely granted refugee status to claimants like him to argue that he had no obligation to seek the protection of a state which had shown itself unable to give it. The Court rejected the idea of a parallel based on Ward, between a state's failure to protect its citizens and a state's refusal to grant refugee status to certain claimants. "Before asserting that he had no chance of success either in seeking protection … [in Algeria …] or in claiming refugee status from the Italian authorities, it was still necessary for the [claimant] either to try do so, or as the Supreme Court stated in Ward, to establish the reasonableness of his failure to seek such protection."

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Note 5

Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 724 and 754. As well, at 754, the Court stated that a valid claim against one country of nationality will not fail if the claimant is denied protection (for example, by being denied admittance) by another country of which he or she is a national.

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Note 6

Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 712 and 722. See also Miranda, Elmer Edgar Valencia v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5882-93), Muldoon, March 31, 1995, where the Court stated, at 23: "… the state's inability to protect is a crucial element in determining whether the refugee claim is objectively well-founded. … the tribunal conducted a separate and distinct consideration of what should have been highly interwoven elements." In Ahmed, Ali v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2868-99), Pinard, May 17, 2000, the Court noted that lack of state protection is relevant after a nexus between the persecution suffered and a Convention ground is established. See also Mejia, Juana Ubaldina Garcia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. 4645-02), Tremblay-Lamer, October 10, 2003; 2003 FC 1180, where the Court again stated that the issue of state protection arises only if a nexus is established. Likewise, there is no need to consider state protection where the claimant fails to establish a subjective fear of persecution: Rivera, Jesus Vargas v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5824-02), Beaudry, November 5, 2003: 2003 FC 1292. See also M.C.I. v. Balogh, Jozsef (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-982-01), Heneghan, November 6, 2001, where the Court stated that the issue of state protection does not exist independently of the inquiry into Convention refugee status. If there is no risk of persecution, the issue of state protection does not arise.

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Note 7

Muotoh, Ndukwe Christopher v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3330-05), Blais, November 25, 2005; 2005 FC 1599. However, if the claimant is at risk, it is not enough to analyze the existence of state protection generally. The Board must link the general findings to the specifies of the claimant: Ullah, Safi v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7814-04), Phelan, July 22,2005; 2005 FC 1018.

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Note 8

The Supreme Court of Canada essentially adopted paragraphs 98, 99 and 100 of the UNHCR Handbook as being an "entirely reasonable reading of the current definition" (Ward, at 718). These paragraphs read as follows:

98. Being unable to avail himself of such protection implies circumstances that are beyond the will of the person concerned. There may, for example be a state of war, civil war or other grave disturbance, which prevents the country of nationality from extending protection or makes such protection ineffective. Protection by the country of nationality may also have been denied to the applicant. Such denial of protection may confirm or strengthen the applicant's fear of persecution, and may indeed be an element of persecution.

99. What constitutes a refusal of protection must be determined according to the circumstances of the case. If it appears that the applicant has been denied services (e.g., refusal of a national passport or extension of its validity, or denial of admittance to the home territory) normally accorded to his co-nationals, this may constitute a refusal of protection within the definition.

100. The term unwilling refers to refugees who refuse to accept the protection of the Government of the country of their nationality. It is qualified by the phrase "owing to such fear". Where a person is willing to avail himself of the protection of his home country, such willingness would normally be incompatible with a claim that he is outside that country "owing to well-founded fear of persecution". Whenever the protection of the country of nationality is available, and there is no ground based on well-founded fear for refusing it, the person concerned is not in need of international protection and is not a refugee.

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Note 9

Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 720-721.

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Note 10

Some cases suggest that the Board should assess the subjective fear of the claimant before addressing the objective basis of his fear, including the availability of state protection. See for example, Troya Jimenez, Jose Walter v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-128-10), Mainville, July 7, 2010; 2010 FC 727; and Pikulin, Alexandr v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5787-09), Martineau, October 1, 2010; 2010 FC 979. In Moreno, Sebastian Velasco v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-454-10), Lutfy, October 5, 2010; 2010 FC 993, the Court said that "the state protection issue should not be a means of avoiding a clear determination concerning the subjective fear of persecution".

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Note 11

Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 722. See also Sandy, Theresa Charmaine v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-22-95), Reed, June 30, 1995, where the Court stated, at 2: "The presumption that persecution will be likely and fear well founded only arises from the establishment of a claimant's subjective fear, 'if there is an absence of state protection' (see Ward, supra, footnote 1). That is, proof of the state's inability to protect, or a presumption relating thereto, does not arise from a finding that the [claimant] has a subjective fear. The need to prove 'state inability to protect' is an additional requirement, and it relates to establishing the objective well-foundedness of the [claimant's] subjective fear." See also Olah, supra, footnote 2.

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Note 12

Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 722.

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Note 13

Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 724-726.

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Note 14

Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 726.

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Note 15

Hinzman, Jeremy v. M.C.I. and Hughey, Brandon David v. M.C.I. (F.C.A, nos. A-182-06; A-185-06). Décary, Sexton, Evans, April 30, 2007; 2007 FCA 171 (leave to appeal dismissed by the SCC on November 15, 2007, [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 321). See also chapter 9 for a full discussion of Hinzman.

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Note 16

Chaves, Alejandro Jose Martinez v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-603-04), Tremblay-Lamer, February 8, 2005; 2005 FC 193.

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Note 17

Badran, Housam v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2472-95), McKeown, March 29, 1996, at 3-4.

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Note 18

Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 724. This principle was applied in Aramburo, Juan Carlos v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6782-93), Cullen, December 7, 1994 (re claimants from Argentina) and in Lerer, Iakov v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-7438-93), Cullen, January 5, 1995 (re Jewish claimants from Russia).

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Note 19

Peralta, Gloria Del Carmen v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5451-01), Heneghan, September 20, 2002; 2002 FCT 989. See also Sanchez, Leonardo Gonzalez v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3154-03), Mactavish, May 18, 2004; 2004 FC 731 and the discussion under section 6.1.8. In Garcia Aldana, Paco Jesus v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2113-06), Hughes, April 19, 2007; 2007 FC 423, the Court noted that the Board must assess the steps actually taken by the claimant in the context of country conditions and consider the interaction that the claimant did have with the police authorities; and in Prieto Velasco, Augosto Pedro v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3900-06), Shore, February 8, 2007; 2007 FC 133, the Court noted that the RPD failed to consider the fact that the claimants' situation worsened after they filed a complaint with the police.

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Note 20

Segura Cortes, Tania Elisa v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-951-06), von Finckenstein, December 12, 2006; 2006 FC 1487.

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Note 21

Malveda, Dennis v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6519-06), Russell, April 4, 2008; 2008 FC 447.

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Note 22

M.C.I. v. Flores Carrillo, Maria del Rosario (F.C.A., no. A-225-07), Létourneau, Nadon, Sharlow, March 12, 2008; 2008 FCA 94.

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Note 23

Explained by the Court as being "reliable and probative".

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Note 24

James, Sherica Sherilon v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5039-09), Mainville, May 18, 2010; 2010 FC 546. See also D.C.L. v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3542-05), von Finckenstein, March 27, 2006; 2006 FC 384.

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Note 25

Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 724. See also Kogan, Meri v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-7282-93), Noël, June 5, 1995, where the Court found that the CRDD could reasonably conclude that the authorities had not refused to protect the claimants given that the claimants had been unable to identify their attackers and had delayed in filing a complaint. See also Carrillo, Marlene Sirias v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4908-03), Snider, June 30, 2004; 2004 FC 944; and Cascante, Maria Leila Bermudez v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4343-03), Kelen, April 26, 2004; 2004 FC 603, where the Court agreed with the RPD that these Costa Rican claimants should have complained to the Ombudsman's office. On the other hand, in Medina, Blanca Patricia v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2322-94), Simpson, October 30, 1995, the Court held that the claimant's failure to approach the state for protection was reasonable in that she had good reasons to believe that her assailants were state security agents. See also footnote 4. In Farias, Carlos Humbero Gonzales v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3305-96), Lutfy, October 3, 1997, the Court stated that the CRDD erred in not specifying what additional steps the claimants should have taken to obtain state protection, especially when the agent of persecution was the state. See also Quintero, Wilfredo Cruz v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3447-96), Campbell, June 6, 1997, where the CRDD erred in criticizing the Honduran claimant for not seeking state protection, where the agent of persecution was the National Investigations Authority (DNI).

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Note 26

Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 724.

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Note 27

D'Mello, Carol Shalini v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1236-97), Gibson, January 22, 1998.

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Note 28

In a case where the claimant was a minor when she was sexually abused by her stepfather, the Court noted that her failure to seek state protection must be assessed in light of her status as a minor at the time: D.C.L., supra, footnote 24.

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Note 29

Badilla, Olman Gamboa v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2738-04), Layden-Stevenson, April 20, 2005; 2005 FC 535; Chaves, Alejandro Jose Martinez v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-603-04), Tremblay-Lamer, February 8, 2005; 2005 FC 193; Morales Filigrana, Felipe v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2440-05), Harrington, October 25, 2005; 2005 FC 1447; Musorin, (Rodshtein), Valei v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2218-04), Snider, March 24, 2005; 2005 FC 408; and Nunez, Anibal Christyan Monte Rey v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-925-05), Mosley, December 6, 2005; 2005 FC 1661.

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Note 30

Aguilar Soto, Rafael Alberto v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1883-10), Shore, November 25, 2010; 2010 FC 1183. See also Prieto Velasco, supra, footnote 19.

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Note 31

In Nadeem, Choudhry Muhammad v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6320-00), McKeown, November 15, 2001, the Court held that the CRDD did not err when it stated that the issue is not whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the police would not be reasonably forthcoming with a guarantee of effective protection but whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the police would not be reasonably forthcoming with serious efforts at protection. The onus is on the claimant to produce clear and convincing evidence that the police would not provide protection, not on the Board to provide proof that there will be state protection. In Ayisi-Nyarko, Isaac v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3671-03), O'Reilly, December 10, 2003; 2003 FC 1425, the claimant thought that making a police report would probably be ineffective because suspects were often released on bail and then would exact reprisals against their accusers. This evidence, however, was not sufficient to displace the presumption that states are willing and able to protect their citizens (Ward). The Federal Court of Appeal in Flores Carrillo, supra, footnote 22 , clarified that the evidentiary burden of producing "clear and convincing evidence" is merely that, an evidentiary burden, on a balance of probabilities, to rebut the presumption of state protection.

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Note 32

Zalzali v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] 3 F.C. 605 (C.A.), at 614; Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 725.

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Note 33

Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 725. For a case where the CRDD did not have proper regard for evidence of similarly situated individuals, see Sanxhaku, Rexhep v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3086-99), Dawson, June 9, 2000.

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Note 34

Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 725. See also section 6.1.12. of this Chapter.

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Note 35

M.E.I. v. Satiacum, Robert (F.C.A., no. A-554-87), Urie, Mahoney, MacGuigan, June 16, 1989. Reported: Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Satiacum (1989), 99 N.R. 171 (F.C.A.).

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Note 36

Ward, supra, footnote 1, at 725 (quoting from Satiacum, at 176). See also M.E.I. v. Hernandez-Ruiz, Maria (F.C.A., no. A-20-92), Marceau, Létourneau, Robertson, February 8, 1993; Bukhari, Zubair Hayder v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6344-93), Richard, November 18, 1994.

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Note 37

M.C.I. v. Kadenko, Ninal (F.C.A., no. A-388-95), Hugessen, Décary, Chevalier, October 15, 1996. Reported: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Kadenko (1996), 143 D.L.R. (4th) 532 (F.C.A.), (application for leave to appeal dismissed by the S.C.C. on May 8, 1997). See also M.C.I. v. Smith, Bob (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3068-97), Lutfy, December 7, 1998, where the Court stated that "the quantum of clear and convincing evidence required to rebut the presumption of a state's ability to protect will depend on its democratic processes." In Diaz De Leon, Andromeda v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6429-06), Frenette, December 12, 2007; 2007 FC 1307, the Court noted that in the case of a developing democracy (in this case Mexico), where corruption and drug trafficking are prevalent, the presumption of state protection can be more easily overcome, particularly if, as in this case, those whose job was to protect could not protect themselves. In Rodriguez Capitaine, Rogelio v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3449-07), Gauthier, January 24, 2008; 2008 FC 98, the Court, in paragraphs 20-22, discusses the notion of "democracy spectrum" raised in Hinzman, supra, footnote 15. It appear to apply not only to exhausting recourses, but also to determining the extent of the evidence needed to displace the presumption and whether it would be unreasonable not to seek protection.

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Note 38

Hinzman, supra, footnote 15.

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Note 39

Katwaru, Shivanand Kumar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3368-06), Teitelbaum, June 8, 2007; 2007 FC 612.

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Note 40

Loaiza Brenes, Heyleen v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2445-06), Barnes, April 2, 2007; 2007 FC 351.

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Note 41

Leon Davila, Marco Antonio v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7645-05), de Montigny, December 11, 2006; 2006 FC 1475.

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Note 42

In Pilliyan, Ponni v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5320-03), Phelan, May 28, 2004; 2004 FC 784, the Court set aside the RPD finding that "there is a basis for protection for senior citizens in Sri Lanka that is relatively comfortable for a Third World state".

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Note 43

Zalzali, supra, footnote 32.

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Note 44

Zalzali, supra, footnote 32, at 615. Applied in Sami, Sami Qowdon v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-629-92), Simpson, June 1, 1994 (re Somaliland). See also Saidi, Ahmed Abrar v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-749-92), Wetston, September 14, 1993, at 3 (re IFA in North Somalia).

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Note 45

Chebli-Haj-Hassam, Atef v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-191-95), Marceau, MacGuigan, Décary, May 28, 1996. Reported: Chebli-Haj-Hassam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 36 Imm. L.R. (2d) 112 (F.C.A.). See also Isufi, Arlind v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5631-02), Tremblay-Lamer, July 15, 2003; 2003 FC 880, where the Court considered the situation of a claimant from Kosovo and had this to say: "In the case at bar, there is no difference in interest between the UN forces and the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As such, the Board did not commit an error in determining that state protection was available to the applicant through non-state actors. … The presence of UN forces is not evidence of a breakdown of the state apparatus in Yugoslavia or Kosovo. The UN forces and security police in Kosovo work in conjunction with the local Kosovo police service to maintain order."

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Note 46

Choker, Ali v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1345-92), Dubé, July 30, 1993. See also section 6.1.12. of this Chapter.

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Note 47

Zalzali, supra, footnote 32, at 615.

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Note 48

M.E.I. v. Villafranca, Ignacio (F.C.A., no. A-69-90), Hugessen, Marceau, Décary, December 18, 1992. Reported: Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Villafranca (1992), 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 130 (F.C.A.). In Sanxhaku, Rexhep v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3086-99), Dawson, June 9, 2000, the Court noted that for Villafranca to apply, one must find the state to be in effective control of its territory. In Nduwimana, Thierive v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1077-01), Lutfy, July 23, 2002; 2002 FCT 812, the Court noted that the CRDD introduced no novel test for state protection when, having concluded that the claimant had not displaced the presumption of state protection according to the principles in Villafranca, it noted that state protection, even where it is not one hundred percent effective, must be such that a claimant will not be exposed to a serious risk of persecution if returned to the country of origin. The Court cautions in Mohacsi, Janos v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1298-02), Martineau, April 11, 2003; 2003 FCT 429, that where there are doubts concerning the effectiveness of the means taken by the government to protect its citizens, the Board must conduct a "reality check" with the claimants' own experiences. See also Peralta Razo, Juan Carlos v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-209-06), Dawson, November 30, 2007; 2007 FC 1265, where the Court noted that it is insufficient for a state to possess institutions designed to provide protection if they do not provide actual and adequate protection. In two cases involving Costa Rica, the Court followed Villafranca and noted that offering a witness  protection program or providing personal protection to every person who files a police complaint is unreasonable by the standards of any country: Alfaro, Oscar Luis Alfaro v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6905-03), O'Keefe, January 20, 2005; 2005 FC 92 and Arias Aguilar, Jennifer v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1000-05), Rouleau, November 9, 2005; 2005 FC 1519.

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Note 49

Villafranca, ibid., at 132-133. (It should be noted that the Court in Villafranca analyzed the issue of protection in the context of a democratic country. Quaere whether the same analysis would hold for a non-democratic country). It has been suggested that Villafranca is bad law in light of Ward, see for example, Waldman, L., Immigration Law and Practice, (LexisNexis Canada Inc. 2005) paragraph 8.440 (Rel. 19-9/2009 Pub 5912), however, in Velarde-Alvarez, Jorge Luis v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-194-94), McKeown, February 9, 1995. Reported: Velarde-Alvarez, Jorge Luis v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-194-94), McKeown, February 9, 1995. Reported as Velarde-Alvarez v. Canada (Secretary of State) (1995), 27 Imm. L.R. (2d) 88 (F.C.T.D.), the Court stated, at 92, that Villafranca dealt with the problems of "unable" in a manner not inconsistent with Ward.

In Karaseva, Tatiana v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4683-96), Teitelbaum, November 26, 1997, the claimant argued that Ward had overturned Villafranca, whereas the Minister contended the opposite relying on Starikov, Nicolai v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1200-95), Pinard, 10 April 1996, where the court clearly considered that the principles in Ward and Villafranca can apply simultaneously. The Court did not specifically address these arguments but concluded as follows:

[28] After considering the evidence, I am satisfied that the applicants have not provided "clear and convincing proof" that the State [Kazakhstan] would not be able to protect them. It does not appear that the applicants could provide the police with sufficient evidence to mount a successful investigation. The police must be given adequate tools in order to investigate a crime and information as to the criminals is a key tool. Furthermore, from a reading of the transcript, I am satisfied the applicants did not take a concerned interest in the reporting or findings of the police.

Similarly, in Badoeva, Manana v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4925-99), Rouleau, November 29, 2000, the Court noted that the victim must be capable of providing the police with the information that is essential in order for an investigation to be conducted. In Milev, Dane v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1125-95), MacKay, June 28, 1996, the Court noted, at 5, that "[t]he fact that the state does not provide perfect protection is not, in itself, a basis for determining that the state is unwilling or unable to offer reasonable protection in the circumstances." In Guirgas, Nabil v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2131-96), Jerome, August 20, 1997, the claimant, a Coptic Christian, feared the Islamic extremists. The Court noted that the state (Egypt) was intent on combating the extremists and had acted in that regard. In Ye, Xin Hao v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-276-01), O'Keefe, February 25, 2002; 2002 FCT 201, the Court upheld the CRDD finding that the claimant, who had not complained to the anti-corruption office set up by the government to deal with complaints about corrupt officials, had not rebutted the presumption of the availability of state protection.

In Boston, Edwin v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6554-06), Snider, December 4, 2007; 2007 FC 1271, the Court noted that Villafranca is not inconsistent with Ward. The Court noted that "[a]bsent evidence to the contrary, a state that can provide adequate protection to all of its citizens who may be subject to persecution by the NPA [guerilla group operating in the Philippines], can also reasonably be found to be able to protect an individual who has suffered at the hands of the same organization. Thus, the Board did not err by focusing its examination on the level of protection vis-à-vis the NPA available for all citizens in the Philippines. In contrast, in the earlier case of De Araujo Garcia, Debora v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5987-05), Campbell, January 24, 2007; 2007 FC 79, Justice Campbell, at paragraph 19, was of the view that Ward amended Villafranca and that the presumption of protection can be rebutted if a claimant produces "some clear and convincing evidence" that the state has failed to effectively respond to requests from women for protection from violent sexual predators. This view appears to be inconsistent with the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Flores Carrillo, supra, footnote 22, that suggests that a heavier evidentiary onus is required to rebut the presumption of state protection - not just "some clear and convincing evidence" as suggested in Araujo Garcia.

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Note 50

Kashif, Muhammad v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3872-06), Mosley, June 4, 2007; 2007 FC 586. See also Paul, Doris v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1470-07), Shore, April 17, 2007; 2007 FC 398, a case involving domestic violence in Grenada.

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Note 51

Bobrik, Iouri v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5519-93), Tremblay-Lamer, September 16, 1994, at 4. See also Howard-Dejo, Luis Fern v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1179-92), Noël, February 2, 1995, where the Court noted that the evidence in the case did not demonstrate merely that the state (Peru) was not always successful in protecting the targets of terrorism but that the authorities were unable to offer protection proportionate to the threat. Also, Freiberg, Valentina v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3419-93), Tremblay-Lamer, May 27, 1994, where the Court concluded that the claimant "related two incidents in which she filed complaints with the police [in Israel] and in which state protection did not materialize … this evidence suffices to justify the [claimant's] reluctance to seek protection from the state." (at 6-7). Freiberg was not followed in G.F. v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1012-95), Muldoon, June 17, 1996, where Justice Muldoon noted that the case was distinguishable on its facts. "In that case, the police refused to intervene. Here, the police offered assistance. It was the principal [claimant] who either did not avail herself of those offers of assistance, or prevented the State from according her its protection by either not giving State authorities details of her plight, or by not reporting her plight to State authorities." Other cases that appear to take a broad view of protection are Alli, Lukman v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1984-01), O'Keefe, April 26, 2002; 2002 FCT 479, a case dealing with ritual violence in Nigeria, where the Court stated that there is a difference between the state offering protection and the state engaging in police investigation and prosecution, Balogh, Rudolf v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6193-00), Lemieux, July 22, 2002; 2002 FCT 809, where the Court said that the willingness to address the situation of the Roma minority in Hungary cannot be equated to adequate state protection; and Bors, Karolyne v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1899-10), Shore, October 12, 2010; 2010 FC 1004, where the Court commented that while Hungary is making efforts, its protection of Roma citizens is not effective. For a contrasting analysis of state protection of Roma in Hungary, see Horvath, Szuzsanna v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4001-01), Blanchard, November 22, 2002; 2002 FCT 1206; Jonas, Laszlo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2726-03), Mosley, August 4, 2004; 2004 FC 1066; and more recently, Banya, Tamas Aron v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4630-10), Harrington, March 15, 2011; 2011 FC 313.

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Note 52

Smirnov v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1995] 1 F.C. 780 (T.D.), at 786. See also Ferguson, Gloria v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5927-01), Noël, November 22, 2002: 2002 FCT 1212, where the Court stated that "[r]eality has to prevail and a test of whether the system is adequate considering the circumstances of the case should be applied." For a case where the facts established that the attacks were not random but targeted, see Badran, supra, footnote 17. Olah, supra, footnote 2, is another case that favours the approach in Smirnov. The Court noted that the protection the claimant received from the acts of her abusive husband in Hungary was not much different than the protection she would have received in Canada. Another case where the Court held that the RPD set too high a standard for state protection is M.C.I. v. Ortega, Alberto Sandova (F.C., no. IMM-2910-03), O'Keefe, October 20, 2004; 2004 FC 1463.

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Note 53

James, Cherrie Ann Louanne v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3352-97), Wetston, June 1, 1998. Reported: James v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), 44 Imm. L.R. (2d) 16 (F.C.T.D).

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Note 54

Almendarez Matute, Reina Isabel v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4698-06), Barnes, June 8, 2007; 2007 FC 616. This was a case where "protection" would have been available on the payment of a bribe.

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Note 55

Zhuravlvev v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] 4 F.C. 3 (T.D.). See also Persue, Yolande v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5827-03), Snider, July 29, 2004; 2004 FC 1042; Villanueva, Carlos Wilfredo Flores v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6897-03), Pinard, October 1, 2004; 2004 FC 1320; and Mejia, Alberto v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2757-03), Pinard, June 30, 2004; 2004 FC 925.

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Note 56

Flores Carrillo, supra, footnote 22. See also Karoly, Szalo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1566-04), Blais, March 24, 2005; 2005 FC 412. See also Ozvald, Zoltan v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6402-03), Lemieux, September 15, 2004; 2004 FC 1250 and Saavedra Sanchez, Perla v. M.C.I. (F.C., IMM-1604-07), Barnes, February 5, 2008; 2008 FC 134, where the Court noted that the RPD had not erred in considering assistance that could be obtained from agencies which may not have a direct responsibility for the provision of protection, such as the Mexican Human Rights Commission.

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Note 57

Thakur, Ramesh Chander v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. 92-T-1665), Dubé, June 18, 1993. In Ajieh, John Kenneth Andzayie v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4985-01), MacKay, March 3, 2003; 2003 FCT 266, the Court, in obiter, notes that "potential assistance from a non-governmental agency is unlikely to be accepted as a satisfactory substitute for state protection." 

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Note 58

Risak, Boris v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6087-93), Dubé, October 24, 1994. Reported: Risak v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 25 Imm. L.R. (2d) 267 (F.C.T.D.), at 270. In Mendoza, Elizabeth Aurora Hauayek v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2997-94), Muldoon, January 24, 1996, at 6, the Court stated the test as follows: "It matters not that there were available human rights organizations [in Venezuela] to whom the [claimant] could have turned for help. The test is whether the [claimant] can look to his/her own government for protection." The same approach was followed in Cuffy, Loferne Pauline v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3135-95), McKeown, October 16, 1996, at 3-4. In Mann, Satinder Pal Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6554-00), Tremblay-Lamer, September 6, 2001, the Court was critical of the Board's reasoning that would require the claimant to accept persecution from the police and wait to be falsely accused in order to benefit form the Court system and be exonerated years later. In Molnar, Elek v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-285-02), Tremblay-Lamer, October 16, 2002; 2002 FCT 1081, the Court held that the Board erred in imposing on the claimant the burden of seeking redress from agencies other than the police. See also Malik, Gurjit Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1918-02), Tremblay-Lamer, April 17, 2003; 2003 FCT 453, where the Court stated that "… there is no obligation on an individual to seek counselling, legal advice, or assistance from human rights agencies if the police is unable to help." The same approach is evident in Mohacsi, Janos v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1298-02), Martineau, April 11, 2003; 2003 FCT 429 and in Tatarski, Aleksandar Zhivkov v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5590-09), Beaudry, June 17, 2010; 2010 FC 660. In contrast, in Nagy, Laszlo v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1467-01), Simpson, March 14, 2002; 2002 FCT 281, the Court agreed with the CRDD that the claimant should have approached the "Minorities Ombudsman" or complained about the police to the prosecutor's investigative office. In Ivachtchenko, Artem v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4964-01), Lemieux, December 12, 2001; 2002 FCT 1291, the Court held that the CRDD erred in holding that the availability of a civil suit was an alternative to criminal prosecution in a case involving criminal assault.

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Note 59

See for example Varga, Attila Csaba v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3363-00), McKeown, May 18, 2001, where the Court held that a single incident where a police officer tells a claimant he got what he deserved would not be sufficient to show clear and convincing evidence that state protection was not available. See also De Baez, Maria Beatriz Arguello v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3208-02), Dawson, June 26, 2003; 2003 FCT 785, where the Court stated that "… the actions of some police officers does not obviate the need to seek protection from the authorities. Discrimination by some police officers is not sufficient proof of the state's unwillingness to provide, or inability on the part of the applicants, to seek protection." See also Antypov, Roksana v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4251-04), Kelen, November 15, 2004; 2004 FC 1589, where the Court, relying on Kadenko, noted that the refusal of certain police officers to take action cannot, in itself, make the state incapable of doing so. To rebut the presumption of state protection, the claimant must do more than simply show that protection was sought from some policemen without success: Kwayisi, Vida v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3756-04), Layden-Stevenson, April 20, 2005; 2005 FC 533.

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Note 60

M.C.I. v. Kadenko, Ninal (F.C.A), supra, footnote 37. See also Levkovicz, Ilia v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-599-94), Nadon, March 13, 1995; Vielma, Eduardo Enrique Pena v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-786-94), Rothstein, November 10, 1994, which deals with a situation where police were involved in actions against journalists (like the claimant) and the Court stated: "… it is at least questionable which state authorities the claimant could ask to protect him …" in those circumstances (at 3); and Machado, Hugo Ricardo Gonzalez v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-7155-93), Rothstein, October 27, 1994.

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Note 61

See for example: Fernandez, Laura v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4591-93), Wetston, July 19, 1994; Contreras, Carlos Fabian Vassallo v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2555-94), MacKay, May 19, 1995. Reported: Contreras v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 36 Imm. L.R. (2d) 75 (F.C.T.D.); and Sandy, supra, footnote 11.

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Note 62

See for example: Resulaj, Blerina v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9548-04), Layden-Stevenson, February 28, 2006; 2006 FC 269; Inigo Contreras, Victor v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3954-05), von Finckenstein, May 16, 2006; 2006 FC 603; Dannett, Avril v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6815-05), Russell, November 10, 2006; 2006 FC 1363; Duceac, Maria v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-899-06), O'Reilly, November 23, 2006; 2006 FC 1400; and Bae, Ki Hwa v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2275-06), Hughes, April 19, 2007; 2007 FC 414.

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Note 63

Szucs, Sandor v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6248-99), Blais, October 3, 2000. In Virag, Istvan Pal v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2761-02), Simpson, June 2, 2003; 2003 FCT 698,  the Court stated that Szucs is to be preferred to Molnar, supra, footnote 58. See also Szorenyi, Gabor v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2817-02), O'Keefe, November 25, 2003; 2003 FC 1382 where the Court noted that there is a long line of cases that have found it reasonable for the Board to require claimants to exhaust avenues of protection and redress in addition to the police where it has been available.

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Note 64

Martinez, Dunnia Patricia Suarez v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7329-04), Phelan, July 29, 2005; 2005 FC 1050. See also Camacho, Jane Egre Sonia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4300-06), Barnes, August 10, 2007; 2007 FC 830, where the Court noted that a refugee claimant does not rebut the presumption of state protection in a functioning democracy by asserting only a "subjective" reluctance to engage the state; and Salazar Santos, Marco Antonio v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4602-06), Barnes, July 30, 2007; 2007 FC 793.

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Note 65

El Khatib, Naif v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5182-93), McKeown, September 27, 1994.

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Note 66

El Khatib, ibid., at 2. The Court agreed to certify the following question:

On a claim to Convention refugee status by a stateless person, is the "well-foundedness" analysis set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in [Ward] applicable, based as it is on the availability of state protection, or is it only applicable if the claimant is a citizen of the country in which he or she fears persecution?

The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal in El Khatib, declined to deal with the certified question because it was not determinative of the appeal. See M.C.I. v. El Khatib, Naif (F.C.A., no. A-592-94), Strayer, Robertson, McDonald, June 20, 1996. In Tarakhan, Ali v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1506-95), Denault, November 10, 1995. Reported: Tarakhan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 32 Imm. L.R. (2d) 83 (F.C.T.D.), at 89, the Court held that where the claim is that of a stateless person, the claimant need only show that he or she is unable, or by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution, is unwilling to return to the country of former habitual residence. The claimant does not have to prove that the authorities of that country are unable or unwilling to protect him or her. In Pachkov, Stanislav v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2340-98), Teitelbaum, January 8, 1999. Reported: Pachkov v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999), 49 Imm. L.R. (2d) 55 (F.C.T.D.), the Court held that the CRDD erred in imposing on the claimant, who was a stateless person, a duty to refute the presumption of state protection. See also Elastal, Mousa Hamed v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3425-97), Muldoon, March 10, 1999, to the same effect, which cited the Court of Appeal decision in Thabet, infra, footnote 69.

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Note 67

Giatch, Stanislav v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3438-93), Gibson, March 22, 1994; Zaidan, Bilal v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1147-92), Noël, June 16, 1994; Zvonov, Sergei v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3030-93), Rouleau, July 18, 1994. Reported: Zvonov v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 28 Imm. L.R. (2d) 23 (F.C.T.D.); Falberg, Victor v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-328-94), Richard, April 19, 1995. This issue was further confused by the decision in M.C.I. v. Vickneswaramoorthy, Poologam (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2634-96), Jerome, October 2, 1997, where the Court suggested that the same standard of proof to demonstrate the state's inability to protect persecuted individuals applies to stateless persons as to those with a country of nationality.

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Note 68

Nizar v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1-92), Reed, January 10, 1996, at 5.

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Note 69

Thabet, Marwan Youssef v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-20-96), Linden, McDonald, Henry, May 11, 1998. Reported: Thabet v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 4 F.C. 21 (C.A.).

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Note 70

See Chapter 2, section 2.2.2.

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Note 71

The examples are not exhaustive.

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Note 72

Mendivil, Luis Altamirano v. S.S.C. (F.C.A., no. A-132-93), Marceau, Stone, Desjardins, February 7, 1994. Reported: Mendivil v. Canada (Secretary of State) (1994), 23 Imm. L.R. (2d) 225 (F.C.A.), at 232, per Desjardins J.A. In Oblitas, Jorge v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2489-94), Muldoon, February 2, 1995, the Court goes so far as to say, at 9, that while the situation in Peru is not quite one of state breakdown (as in Zalzali, supra, footnote 32), it comes close. In the Court's view, the claimants had proven that state protection was not reasonably forthcoming.

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Note 73

Mendivil, ibid., at 230. The case involved a claimant who had been specifically targeted by the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) in Peru. In Yanahida, Gustavo Angel Castro v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6019-93), Richard, October 13, 1994, on the other hand, the claimant failed to present "clear and convincing proof" that the state (Peru) was unable to protect him. The evidence of the claimant was that the protection of ordinary citizens was the lowest priority. The Court held, at 4, that "[i]n the absence of any additional evidence, I consider that the claimant has not discharged his burden." (at 4) The state's obligation to provide private (24-hour) protection to its citizens was considered, and found not to be determinative, in Baldizon-Ortegaray, German Jose v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. 92-T-1933), May 7, 1993. Reported: Baldizon-Ortegaray v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 20 Imm. L.R. (2d) 307 (F.C.T.D.), a pre-Ward case, at 311. See also Velarde-Alvarez, supra, footnote 49, at 91; Yaguna, Jose Stalin Rojas v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2468-94), Simpson, May 25, 1995, at 5; and Petit, Juan Daniel Ayllon v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1197-92), Rouleau, January 12, 1996, at 6.

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Note 74

M.E.I. v. Johan, Stephen (F.C.T.D., no. T-1389-92), Denault, February 9, 1993; Callejas, Ana Lucretia v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-48-93), Gibson, February 1, 1994. Reported: Callejas v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 23 Imm. L.R. (2d) 253 (F.C.T.D.), at 258-260; Kraitman, Vadim v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-88-94), Teitelbaum, July 5, 1994. Reported: Kraitman v. Canada (Secretary of State) (1994), 27 Imm. L.R. (2d) 283 (F.C.T.D.), where the evidence indicated that the police in Ukraine refused to investigate complaints made by Jews. The Court concluded, at 13, that "[t]his is clear indication that Jews were not being offered the protection of the state, that is, Jews could not go to the police for protection. The police may have the ability to offer protection but where it chooses not to, this is equivalent to saying it is unable to provide protection to the [claimants]." In another case dealing with a claimant from Colombia, Bohorquez, Gabriel Enriquez v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-7078-93), McGillis, October 6, 1994, the Court found the conclusion of the CRDD that the claimant had failed to provide "clear and convincing proof" unreasonable: "The credible and uncontradicted evidence of the [claimant] established that he sought the help of various police and enforcement agencies on fifteen or twenty occasions. The [claimant] was repeatedly told that nothing could be done to protect him and no investigation into the source of the threats or the attempted assassination was ever conducted." (at 3).

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Note 75

Zalzali, supra, footnote 32. However, for the principle in Zalzali to apply, the claimant must demonstrate a prospective risk of persecution, thus, in Roble, Abdi Burale v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-1101-91), Heald, Stone, McDonald, April 25, 1994. Reported: Roble v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 169 N.R. 125 (F.C.A.), where the agent of persecution (the NSS in Somalia) was no longer a factor, the Court held that "… the inability of the state to protect the [claimant] is not, in itself, a sufficient basis for his claim." (at 130).

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Note 76

Ward; supra, footnote 1, Surujpal, Khemraj v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-515-84), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan, April 25, 1985. Reported: Surujpal v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1985), 60 N.R. 73 (F.C.A.); Rajudeen, Zahirdeen v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-1779-93), Heald, Hugessen, Stone (concurring), July 4, 1984. Reported: Rajudeen v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1984), 55 N.R. 129 (F.C.A.). In a case involving Peru, Gonzales, Abel Guillermo Mayorga v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-117-93), Noël, February 25, 1994, the Court noted, at 3, that the evidence showed that the army had been infiltrated by the terrorists and that it was powerless against their attacks. In the circumstances, it was unreasonable for the CRDD to conclude "… that the [claimant] was likely to be given adequate protection."

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Note 77

Silva, Donakanthi Sujatha v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4584-93), Denault, August 3, 1994, at 2-3. See also Yokota, Aldo Renato Rossi v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8386-03), Lutfy, September 8, 2004; 2004 FC 1226.

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Note 78

Soopramanien, Dorothy Anette v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1572-92), Pinard, October 5, 1993, at 2 (re Seychelles).

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Note 79

Barabhuiyan, Abdullah Al Mamun v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-998-92), Tremblay-Lamer, November 30, 1993 (re Bangladesh).

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Note 80

Manorath, Rahonie v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2369-94), Cullen, January 26, 1995, at 6 and Arguedas, Maricela Los Angeles Alfaro v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5766-02), Lemieux, January 23, 2004; 2004 FC 112, But see Williams, Debby v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4244-94), Reed, June 30, 1995, and.Clyne, Timeka Marsha v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7653-03), O'Reilly, November 29, 2004; 2004 FC 1670.

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Note 81

Levitina (Chikhovtseva), Tatiana v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6591-93), Noël, January 27, 1995, at 3. See also Cho, Soon Ja v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4029-99), Gibson, August 9, 2000.

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Note 82

Torres, Betsabe Del Carmen Balmaceda v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2009-04), Pinard, May 10, 2005; 2005 FC 660.

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Note 83

Annan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] 3 F.C. 25 (T.D.), at 30. In Neto, Joao Reis v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4061-06), Mactavish, June 21, 2007; 2007 FC 664, the Court noted that the Board had spent considerable time discussing the legislative efforts being made in Brazil to combat homophobia but had not given real consideration to whether those actions had in fact translated into any meaningful protection.

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Note 84

Mallam, Sanni Mohammad v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2780-96), Pinard, June 30, 1997. Contrast this with Alli, supra, footnote 51, where the Court stated that a finding by the CRDD that the police do investigate and prosecute incidents of ritual violence was different from the police offering protection to persons such as the claimant.

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Note 85

Hussain, Majeed v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2345-02), O'Reilly, April 8, 2003; 2003 FCT 406.

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